FOR
THE
DOUBTER:
A
TOUR
WITH
UNCLE SAM!
I put this binder together to prove to the “Doubting Thomases” that something very serious is going on in this country! The pages are full up with special bona fide documents, and different articles to support the fact that a “new world order” is shaping up that will take away your Constitutional government and put you under a military government!
I used to take people on a tour. Then one day I decided to ask Uncle Sam if he would join me in this effort, and he said he would! He was willing to become the tour guide. He will be with us in just a few minutes. My job is to prepare you for the tour. So first, I must prove to you that it is possible for something to exist that you cannot see! That will make you appreciate the tour better!

I do a little lecture through the next 10 pages and then I introduce you to your tour guide, Uncle Sam! He happens to be the real Uncle Sam! Make no mistake about that! He knows his stuff!

He will zip in and out through the pages of the tour. Sometimes he says a lot, and sometimes he says just a little to make you understand the value of what you are looking at! When he is done, I will come back and wind up the tour with the article I wrote called: “To Sink or Swim.”

You may want to read that before you start the tour as it wraps the whole thing up, and you get the overall picture in a hurry, but if you are new to this subject, you’d better stay with Uncle Sam’s part of the tour first, because he teaches you from scratch and he goes slowly. After that, I will be back!

See ya’!
Dear Fellow American:

On the opposite page is a picture engineered to trick you! The picture contains 12 objects, all of which are hidden right before your eyes, which at first glance, you didn't see, did you? Most likely -- you would not have noticed all 12 of the following objects -- unless their existence had been told to you:

Did you see these Hidden Objects on the opposite page?

- cow
- boot
- boat
- lantern
- butterfly
- guitar
- dancing spoon
- frog
- bat
- dancing dish
- elf
- dog

In all fairness, will you not agree that there is a possibility that certain political arrangements have been developed that could have escaped your sight and evaluation? Going on the basis that you are a fair person, (1) willing to adjust your thinking to new information which previously has been denied you, and (2) willing to re-evaluate the circumstances presented herein, this compilation has been prepared for your consideration.

Continued
Evil goals that you would not knowingly approve of, and which are altering the integrity and existence of our system of government, are hidden or are being passed off as "normal" laudable objectives. By bringing the whole picture into conformity, the fog is lifted for a clear understanding of the strange happenings in government.

There is no other reason for the arduous task involved in preparation of this compilation other than to warn fellow Americans of their true predicament. This compilation presents bona fide data taken from original sources. It is not simply by accident that so much highly irregular legislation and portentous treaties are being passed!

Americans are being beguiled by talk show hosts who keep the facts from them or twist facts to keep the public uninformed. Many talk show hosts are also used as disinformation agents, or "change agents". These are professional liars and are hired to be apologists for obvious mistakes of leading new world order (globalist) public officials.

Unfortunately, there are too many Americans who do not understand the proper workings of their own government; therefore, they are not able to recognize when the system is being attacked and seriously undermined. For the safety and endurance of our state and nation, we feel that it is incumbent upon those who are fair-minded and responsible persons to give this evidence its rightful consideration.

Please do your part to preserve the American heritage for those who are too young to understand or to guard against the workings of men with conniving minds. It is the duty of real Americans to guard the young against becoming victims of political oppressors.

Respectfully,
SECOND AMENDMENT COMMITTEE

Bernadine Smith, National Director
It has been demonstrated to you that some things can be hidden from you, and yet truly are in your full view once you have been alerted to their presence!
The documents that follow are exact copies of authenticated originals.
They have been reproduced so that you can decide on your own whether or not something harmful is being done by the alterations being made to our Constitutional system of government.
It is hoped that you will detect the pattern and grasp the relationship of the parts, and thereby see the full picture.
Samuel B. Pettengill, who represented Indiana’s 3rd Congressional District in the 1930’s published a book in 1940 which was entitled:

**SMOKE-SCREEN.**

In SMOKE-SCREEN Pettengill warned:

“The progress will be gradual, but the end inevitable. There will be no sudden coup d'etat. The march will be step by step, and by muffled tread. It will move under the smoke-screen of laudable “objectives” to its hidden goal. That goal is National Socialism.”

Well said, Mr. Pettengill!

Before the Congress was taken over by quizlings— we used to have some fine, really true patriots in office— who tried to wake up the people as to what was going on! Besides Samuel Pettengill, there was William E. Jenner, James Utt, Larry McDonald, John Rarick, Usher Burdick, John Ashbrook, etc.

but the communists took more open control of our movies, radios, news-papers, and TV. after World War II. Our schools and churches also fell victim to those evil policies and our people have been propagandized. People are still being denied the facts about the socialist/communist takeover of America. Now, please turn the page.
People don't want to believe because public officials don't report these issues in the usual news media.

The news media was bought up in the '50's, '60's, and '70's. The news is controlled and filtered.
Why is it that people don’t believe when you tell them what is happening?

Even though adequate proof is at their disposal, the uninformed often choose not to believe nor to respect the well-meaning informant who had only intended to awaken his fellow citizens.

Each disbelieving person has to undergo a traumatic reaction when irrefutable documents are laid before him revealing the plan to transfer our total armed forces on a permanent basis to the communists who operate the United Nations.

The people’s innocent response to being told of such calamitous betrayals is: “It doesn’t sound real!” After a while, they ask “Is this really true?”

Many choose to rationalize and disbelieve the alarms set off by their fellow citizens: “If it were true,” they rationalize, “the newspapers would have printed articles about it!”

We must agree: It doesn’t seem real that certain public officials would betray us, but the truth is that they have betrayed us! In order to import a peaceful way in time to save the country and our American Heritage, we must gain the support of loyal public officials actively holding office. If they come forward and tell of the sedition within government, they will have instant believers.

With the credibility public officials have, they can much more readily break into the news and thus awaken the sleeping giant! In turn, this will broaden the base of support so necessary for a calm solution.

1 This is the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament which also includes the closing of U.S. defense plants, military bases, and prohibiting law-abiding people from possessing firearms. This law has been passed and is found in U.S. Code books under Title 22, Section 2551, et seq.
John Swinton, one of the best loved newspaper men in the United States, the Dean of his profession, when asked for a toast before the New York Press Club, is quoted as saying:

"There is no such thing, at this date of the world's history, in America, as an independent press. You know it and I know it.

There is not one of you who dares to write your honest opinions, and if you did, you know beforehand that it would never appear in print. I am paid $150.00 a week for keeping my honest opinion out of the paper I am connected with. Others of you are paid similar salaries for similar things, and any of you who would be so foolish as to write honest opinions would be out on the streets looking for another job. If I allowed my honest opinions to appear in one issue of my paper, before twenty-four hours my occupation would be gone.

The business of the journalists is to destroy the truth: to lie outright; to pervert, to vilify; to fawn at the feet of mammon and to sell his country and his race for his daily bread, you know it and I know it, and what folly is this toasting an independent press.

We are the tools and vassals of rich men behind the scenes. We are the jumping-jacks -- they pull the strings and we dance--our talents, our possibilities and our lives are all the property of other men. We are intellectual prostitutes."
Well, friend, this is where I leave you. From here on, Uncle Sam takes over. He used to work 100% of the time, but now he is only working **part time**, you know! He says only ‘about 10% of the time’ is all! That’s real sad, because the other 90% of the time they try to hide him in a closet.

But he won’t go! He refuses! He wants everybody to know that he loves to work for the people, and he wants to be around helping them. Well, he is ready now to show you lots of papers and documents. He calls it his “evidence of mistreatment” and he is hanging on to the stuff. He says there will be a time when it will all come in handy. **That will be Sam’s BIG DAY!** Maybe you can help him to get back on full time work. If so, leave your name and number. For now, be attentive and considerate. I’ll pick you back up later... Bernadine
Are you ready for the Tour with the real Uncle Sam?
YES,
I AM THE REAL UNCLE SAM.

I REPRESENT THE TRUE LAW OF THIS NATION.

I AM THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION.

I WILL SHOW YOU WHAT IS HAPPENING TO YOU AND ME.
MAN HAS A RIGHT TO LIMIT THE POWER THAT MAN CAN EXERCISE OVER HIS FELLOW MAN.

I WAS NOT INSTITUTED TO BE A DEMOCRACY.

I STAND FOR A REPUBLIC.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS HAVE TAKEN ON SELF-ENDOwed POWERS WHICH THE PEOPLE HAVE NEVER CONSENTED TO ALLOW THEM.

THERE HAS BEEN NO "CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED" FOR THE THINGS YOU WILL SEE ON THIS TOUR. THESE ARE VIOLATIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
WHAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO SEE IS NOT THEORY!

YOU ARE LOOKING AT AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS THAT EXPOSE A PROGRAM THAT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED AND ONGOING EVER SINCE IT WAS SIGNED INTO "LAW" IN 1961.
SOMEONE HAS TO ANSWER FOR THIS!

Congress was never authorized to transfer over our armed forces to a foreign power!
Having an armed force to protect your country

is one of your most precious possessions.

It protects your borders,

your Constitution,

your Bill of Rights,

your land, your family,

and your personal life.

Do you agree that we should **not** be

eliminating our armed forces? Please

take a look at this official law

signed in 1961 by John F. Kennedy,

calling for the United States

to eliminate its armed forces.

It calls for **general** and **complete disarmament**

including weapons of all kinds in the hands

of the law-abiding people!

How safe will you be then?
Public Law 87-297
87th Congress, H. R. 9118
September 26, 1961

An Act

To establish a United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—SHORT TITLE, PURPOSE, AND DEFINITIONS

SHORT TITLE

Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Act".

PURPOSE

Sec. 2. An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law, and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. It is the purpose of this Act to provide impetus toward this goal by creating a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament.

Arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole. The formulation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy in a manner which will promote the national security can best be insured by a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field. This organization must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the executive branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the desirability of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy.

This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based. It must be able to carry out the following primary functions:

(a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation;

(b) The preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;

(c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and

(d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

DEFINITIONS

Sec. 3. As used in this Act—

(a) The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" mean the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, and elimination of all armaments and armed forces of all kinds under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement to establish an effective system of inter-

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This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based. It must be able to carry out the following primary functions:

(a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation;
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national control, or to create and strengthen international organizations for the maintenance of peace.

(b) The term "Government agency" means any executive department, commission, agency, independent establishment, corporation wholly or partly owned by the United States which is an instrumentality of the United States, or any board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, authority, administration, or other establishment in the executive branch of Government.

(c) The term "Agency" means the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

**TITLE II—ORGANIZATION**

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Establishment of agency.

Sec. 21. There is hereby established an agency to be known as the "United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency".

DIrector

Sec. 22. The Agency shall be headed by a Director, who shall serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters. In carrying out his duties under this Act the Director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, or the President, who is authorized and directed, the Director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters, as defined in this Act. He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He shall receive compensation at the rate of $20,000 per annum.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Sec. 23. A Deputy Director of the Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He shall receive compensation at the rate of $15,000 per annum. The Deputy Director shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Director may prescribe. He shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability or during a vacancy in said office.

ASSISTANT DIRECTORS

Sec. 24. Not to exceed four Assistant Directors may be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. They shall receive compensation at the rate of $10,000 per annum. They shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Director may prescribe.

BUREAUS, OFFICES, AND DIVISIONS

Sec. 25. The Director, under the direction of the Secretary of State, may establish within the Agency such bureaus, offices, and divisions as he may determine to be necessary to discharge his responsibilities under this Act, including, but not limited to, an Office of the General Counsel.

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Sec. 26. The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may appoint a General Advisory Committee of not to exceed fifteen members to advise the Director on arms control and disarmament policy and activities. The President shall designate one of the members as Chairman. The members of the committee may receive the compensation and reimbursement for expenses specified for consultants by section 41(d) of this Act. The Committee shall meet at least twice each year. It shall from time to time advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Disarmament Director respecting matters affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace.

**TITLE III—FUNCTIONS**

RESEARCH

Sec. 31. The Director is authorized and directed to exercise his powers in such manner as to secure the acquisition of a fund of theoretical and practical knowledge concerning disarmament. To this end, the Director is authorized and directed, under the direction of the President, (1) to encourage the conduct of research, development, and other studies in the field of arms control and disarmament; (2) to make arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and grants) for the conduct of research, development, and other studies in the field of arms control and disarmament by private or public institutions or persons; and (3) to coordinate the research, development, and other studies conducted under this Act, and to make such arrangements as may be necessary to ensure that the results of such studies are utilized to the fullest extent possible.

(a) the detection, identification, inspection, monitoring, limitation, reduction, control, and elimination of armed forces and armaments, including thermonuclear, nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons;

(b) the techniques and systems of detecting, identifying, inspecting, and monitoring of tests of nuclear, thermonuclear, and other weapons;

(c) the analysis of national budgets, levels of industrial production, and economic indicators to determine the amounts spent by various countries for armaments;

(d) the control, reduction, and elimination of armed forces and armaments in space, in areas on and beneath the earth's surface, and in underwater regions;

(e) the structure and operation of international control and other organizations useful for arms control and disarmament;

(f) the training of scientists, technicians, and other personnel for running the control systems which may be created by international arms control and disarmament agreements;

(g) the reduction and elimination of the danger of war resulting from accident, misadventure, or possible surprise attack, including (but not limited to) improvements in the methods of communication between nations;

(h) the economic and political consequences of arms control and disarmament, including the planning for resettlement arising in industry and the reallocation of national resources;

(i) the arms control and disarmament implications of foreign and national security policies of the United States with a view to a better understanding of the significance of such policies for the achievement of arms control and disarmament;

(j) the national security and foreign policy implications of arms control and disarmament proposals with a view to a better understanding of the effect of such proposals upon national security and foreign policy;
(k) methods for the maintenance of peace and security during different stages of arms control and disarmament;

(l) the scientific, economic, political, legal, social, psychological, military, and technological factors related to the prevention of war with a view to a better understanding of how the basic structure of a lasting peace may be established;

(m) such related problems as the Director may determine to be in need of research, development, or study in order to carry out the provisions of this Act.

PATENTS

Sec. 22. All research within the United States contracted for, sponsored, cosponsored, or authorized under authority of this Act, shall be provided for in such manner that all information as to uses, products, processes, patents, and other developments resulting from such research developed by Government expenditure will (with such exceptions and limitations, if any, as the Director may find to be necessary in the public interest) be available to the general public. This subsection shall not be so construed as to deprive the owner of any background patent relating thereto of such rights as he may have thereunder.

POLICY FORMULATION

Sec. 23. The Director is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies as the President may direct, recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy. Provided, however, That no action shall be taken under this Act or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or the arsenals of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.

NEGOTIATIONS AND RELATED FUNCTIONS

Sec. 24. Under the direction of the Secretary of State—

(a) the Director, for the purpose of conducting negotiations concerning arms control and disarmament or for the purpose of exercising any other authority given him by this Act, may (1) act as a representative of the other nations or of international organizations, and (2) communicate in the name of the Secretary with diplomatic representatives of the United States in this country and abroad.

(b) the Director shall perform functions pursuant to section 2(c) of Reorganization Plan 8 of 1953 with respect to providing to the United States Information Agency official United States positions and policy on arms control and disarmament matters for coordination and services.

(c) the Director is authorized (1) to formulate plans and make preparations for the establishment, operation, and funding of inspection and control systems which may become part of the United States arms control and disarmament activities, and (2) as authorized by law, to put into effect, direct, or otherwise assume United States responsibility for such systems.

Sec. 35. The President is authorized to establish procedures to (1) assure cooperation, consultation, and a continuing exchange of information between the Agency and the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and any other affected Government agencies, in all significant respects of United States arms control and disarmament policy and related matters, including current and prospective programs, proposals, and programs, (2) resolve differences of opinion between the Director and such other agencies which cannot be resolved through consultation, and (3) provide for presentation to the President of recommendations of the Director with respect to such differences, when such differences involve major matters of policy and cannot be resolved through consultation.

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

GENERAL AUTHORITY

Sec. 41. In the performance of his functions, the Director is authorized to—

(a) utilize or employ the services, personnel, equipment, or facilities of any other Government agency, with the consent of the agency concerned, to perform such functions on behalf of the Agency as may appear desirable. It is the intent of this section that the Director rely upon the Department of State for general administrative services in the United States and abroad to the extent agreed upon between the Secretary of State and the Director. Any Government agency is authorized, notwithstanding any provision of law, to transfer to or to receive from the Director, without reimbursement, supplies and equipment, other than administrative supplies or equipment. Transfer or receipt of excess property shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Property Management Act of 1949, as amended;

(b) appoint officers and employees, including attorneys, for the Agency in accordance with the civil service laws and fix their compensation in accordance with the Classification Act of 1949, as amended;

(c) enter into agreements with other Government agencies, including the military departments through the Secretary of Defense, under which officers or employees of such agencies may be detailed to the Agency for the performance of service pursuant to this Act without prejudice to the status or advancement of such officers or employees within their own agencies;

(d) procure services of experts and consultants or organizations thereof, including geosynthetic and extraneous services, as authorized by section 13 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (5 USC 561), and to pay in connection therewith travel expenses of individuals, including transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence while away from their homes or regular places of business, as authorized by section 5 of said Act, as amended (5 USC 570); Provided, That no such individual shall be employed for more than one hundred days in any fiscal year unless the President certifies that employment of such individual in excess of such number of days is necessary in the national interest: And provided further, That such contracts may be renewed annually;
(a) employ individuals of outstanding ability without compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 9(b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2160), and regulations issued thereunder;

(b) establish advisory boards to advise with and make recommendations to the Director on United States arms control and disarmament policy and activities. The members of such boards may receive the compensation and reimbursement for expenses specified for consultants by section 41(d) of this Act;

(c) delegate, as appropriate, to the Deputy Director or other officers of the Agency, any authority conferred upon the Director by any provision of this Act; and

(d) make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary or desirable to the exercise of any authority conferred upon the Director by the provisions of this Act.

FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE AND STAFF OFFICERS

Sec. 42. The Secretary of State may authorize the Director to exercise, with respect to Foreign Service Reserve officers and Foreign Service Staff officers and employees appointed or employed for the Agency, the following authority: (1) The authority available to the Secretary of State under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended; (2) the authority available to the Secretary under any other provision of law pertaining specifically, or generally applicable, to such officers or employees, and (3) the authority of the Board of Foreign Service pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended.

CONTRACTS OR EXPENDITURES

Sec. 43. The President may, in advance, exempt actions of the Director from the provisions of law relating to contracts or expenditures of any funds whatever for purposes of national security determined that such action is essential in the interest of United States arms control and disarmament and security policy.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DUAL COMPENSATION LAWS

Sec. 44. The members of the General Advisory Committee created by section 26 of this Act, and the members of the advisory boards, the consultants, and the individuals of outstanding ability employed without compensation, all of which are provided in section 41 of this Act, shall be selected without regard to any provision of section 281, 283, 284, or 1914 of title 18 of the United States Code, or section 190 of the Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. 98), or of any other Federal law imposing restrictions, requirements, or penalties in relation to the employment of individuals, the performance of services, or the payment or receipt of compensation in connection with any claim, proceeding, or matter involving the United States Government, except as may be necessary to prevent interference with provisions of law may prohibit the effect on such individual from receiving compensation from a source other than a nonprofit educational institution in respect of any particular matter in which the Agency is directly interested. Nor shall such service be considered as employment or holding of office or position bringing such individual within the provisions of section 15 of the Civil Service Retirement Act (5 U.S.C. 2035), as amended (5 U.S.C. 2035), or any other Federal law limiting the remuneration of retired officers or employees or governing the simultaneous receipt of compensation and retired pay or annuities.

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

Sec. 45. (a) The Director shall establish such security and loyalty requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as he deems necessary in the interest of the national security and to carry out the provisions of this Act. The Director shall arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of full-field background security and loyalty investigations of all the Agency's officers, employees, consultants, persons detailed from other Government agencies, members of its General Advisory Committee, and advisory boards, contractors, subcontractors, and their officers and employees, actual or prospective. In the event the investigation discloses information indicating that the person investigated may or may become a security risk, or may be of doubtful loyalty, the report of the investigation shall be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full-field investigation. The final results of all such investigations shall be turned over to the Director for final determination. No person shall be permitted to enter on duty as such officer, employee, consultant, or member of advisory committee or board, or pursuant to any such detail, and no contractor or subcontractor, or officer or employee thereof, shall be permitted to have access to any classified information, unless he shall have been investigated in accordance with this section and the report of such investigations made to the Director, and the Director shall have determined that such person is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty. Standards applicable with respect to the security clearance of persons within any category referred to in this subsection shall not be less stringent, and the investigation of such persons shall not be less intensive, than in the case of such clearance of persons in a corresponding category under the security procedures of the Government agency or agencies having the highest security restrictions with respect to persons in such category.

(b) The Atomic Energy Commission may authorize any of its employees, or of any contractor, subcontractor, prospective contractor, licensee, or prospective licensee of the Atomic Energy Commission, or any other person authorized to have access to Restricted Data by the Atomic Energy Commission under section 535 of title 42, to permit the Director or any officer, employee, consultant, person detailed from other Government agencies, member of the General Advisory Committee, or any advisory board established pursuant to section 41(f), contractor, subcontractor, prospective contractor, or prospective subcontractor, to have access to Restricted Data which is required in the performance of his duties and as certified by the Director, but only if (1) the Atomic Energy Commission has determined, in accordance with the established personnel security procedures and standards of the Commission, that permitting such individual to have access to such Restricted Data will not endanger the national defense and security, and (2) the Atomic Energy Commission finds that the established personnel and other security procedures and standards of the Agency are adequate and in reasonable conformity with the standards established by the Atomic Energy Commission under section 2160 of title 42, including their clearance in subsection (b) thereof. Any individual granted access to such Restricted Data pursuant to this subsection may exchange such data with any individual who (A) is an officer or employee of the Department of Defense, or any department or agency thereof, or a member of the Armed Forces, or an officer or employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or a contractor or subcontractor

42 Stat. 673.
44 Stat. 707.
76 Stat. 377.
September 26, 1961 -9- Pub. Law 87-297

United States Code; entertainment and official courtesy to the extent authorized by appropriation; expenditures for training and study; expenditures in connection with participation in international conferences for the purpose of this Act; and expenses in connection with travel of personnel outside the United States, including transportation expenses of dependents, household goods, and personal effects, and expenses authorized by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, not otherwise provided for.

APPROPRIATION

Sec. 48. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $10,000,000 to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
FREEDOM FROM WAR

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

Clippings from this document are shown on the right.
THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

FREEDOM FROM WAR
FREEDOM FROM WAR

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Introduction

The revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences has produced a crisis in human history. In order to overcome the danger of nuclear war now confronting mankind, the United States has introduced at the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations a Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.

This new program provides for the progressive reduction of the war-making capabilities of nations and the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions to settle disputes and maintain the peace. It sets forth a series of comprehensive measures which can and should be taken in order to bring about a world in which there will be freedom from war and security for all states. It is based on three principles deemed essential to the achievement of practical progress in the disarmament field:

First, there must be immediate disarmament action:

A strenuous and uninterrupted effort must be made toward the goal of general and complete disarmament; at the same time, it is important that specific measures be put into effect as soon as possible.
Second, all disarmament obligations must be subject to effective international controls:

The control organization must have the manpower, facilities, and effectiveness to assure that limitations or reductions take place as agreed. It must also be able to certify to all states that retained forces and armaments do not exceed those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process.

Third, adequate peace-keeping machinery must be established:

There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.

There follows a summary of the principal provisions of the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. The full text of the program is contained in an appendix to this pamphlet.
the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

- The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations;
- The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.

**TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATES**

The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved. To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form part of the total program.

**GOVERNING PRINCIPLES**

The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:

- As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;
- Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;
- Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and
- Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state.

**DISARMAMENT STAGES**

The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take place in three stages and for the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions.

**FIRST STAGE**

The first stage contains measures which would significantly reduce the capabilities of nations to wage
aggressive war. Implementation of this stage would mean that:

- The nuclear threat would be reduced:

  All states would have adhered to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons.
  The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be stopped and quantities of such materials from past production would be converted to non-weapons uses.
  States owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and would not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.
  States not owning nuclear weapons would not manufacture them or attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states.
  A Commission of Experts would be established to report on the feasibility and means for the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

- Strategic delivery vehicles would be reduced:

  Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and weapons designed to counter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.

- Arms and armed forces would be reduced:

  The armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding that amount for other militarily significant states); levels of armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be limited.
  An Experts Commission would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

- Peaceful use of outer space would be promoted:

  The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction would be prohibited.
  States would give advance notification of space vehicle and missile launchings.

- U.N. peace-keeping powers would be strengthened:

  Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.

- An International Disarmament Organization would be established for effective verification of the disarmament program:

  Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.
It would certify to all states that agreed reductions have taken place and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels. It would determine the transition from one stage to the next.

- States would be committed to other measures to reduce international tension and to protect against the chance of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack:
  - States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.
  - A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.
  - States would be committed to give advance notice of major military movements which might cause alarm; observation posts would be established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

SECOND STAGE

The second stage contains a series of measures which would bring within sight a world in which there would be freedom from war. Implementation of all measures in the second stage would mean:

- Further substantial reductions in the armed forces, armaments, and military establishments of states, including strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and countering weapons;
- Further development of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes under the United Nations;
- Establishment of a permanent international peace force within the United Nations;
- Depending on the findings of an Experts Commission, a halt in the production of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons and a reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses;
- On the basis of the findings of an Experts Commission, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons;
- The dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and
- The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament Organization to enable it to verify the steps taken in Stage II and to determine the transition to Stage III.

THIRD STAGE

During the third stage of the program, the states of the world, building on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal of a world in which:

- States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.
* The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

* The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

* The peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

**Appendix**

**DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT**

**THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD**

The Nations of the world,

Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;
(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;

(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

Call on the negotiating states:

(a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;

(b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;

(c) Also to seek—without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program—agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.

Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.

(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

(d) As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:

**STAGE 1**

**A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:**

(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the estab-
lishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (g) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.5 million each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.2 million each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.

(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.

(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to contain such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to contain such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to contain such vehicles shall be limited or halted.

E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.
(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IDO of launches of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and airports to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.

(d) A commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

G. To Keep the Peace:

(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force—including nuclear, conventional, or CBR—contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.

(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a U.N. Peace Force.

(e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

STAGE II

A. International Disarmament Organization:

The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.

(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR wepons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the remaining excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the find-
ings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.

D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, in the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to

a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.

(b) The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.
The program provides for the progressive disarmament of all nations, and that they do not remain armed forces and armies. Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for the establishment of international law and for the development in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.

Explanations of the United Nations' arrangement for Stage II is reached at the present time and the point settlement of the division of a international world.

As states discontinue their armed forces, the United Nations must be progressively transformed in order to maintain international security and permit the peaceful settlement of disputes.

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This law was passed in 1961 —signed by John F. Kennedy. Eighteen addenda have been added, making it worse, up to and including 1966. It is very viable and forms basis for President Bush’s Summit Conferences. It calls for elimination of our armed forces, permanently transferring them to the United Nations.

Moore KOs Lavorante in 10th

U.S. FORMULA FOR PEACE
One Military Force Under U.N. Control

L.A. Times March 20, 1962

U.S. TO PROPOSE END OF NATIONAL ARMIES
U.S. FORMULA FOR PEACE
One Military Force Under U.N. Control

News Summary

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Plan for U.N. Peace Force Ready to Be Submitted at Geneva

U.S. THREE-STAGE DISARMAMENT PLAN

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STAGE II

STAGE III

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY
There was a time when the newspapers reported on the "general and complete disarmament program" just as you see here, but soon the newspapers were bought out because of the outcry from the then-informed public.

Unfortunately, new generations have come in and they know little or nothing of the continuing plan.

Folks, if you doubt what I am telling you, make a visit to your federal depository library and ask to be shown a full copy of P.L. 87-297. They may hide Sections 2551, 2552 (a), 2571 (a), etc. of Title 22 U.S.C. Insist that you be shown these sections. These sections have never been rescinded.
Go ahead, pull this page up, and take a look at this shocking booklet printed by the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency. When John Kennedy spoke to the United Nations on September 25, 1961, this "Blueprint for the Peace Race" booklet was not yet ready, so Kennedy ordered the State Department to briefly summarize its contents using the little blue book called "FREEDOM FROM WAR". (I just showed you that little blue book called State Dept. Publication #7277 just a few pages back.)

Six months later this booklet became published, When the president speaks of "peace" this is what he is referring to! No Army! No Navy! No Air Force! And no guns for the citizens!

BLUEPRINT FOR THE PEACE RACE

Outline of Basic Provisions
of a Treaty on
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World
BLUEPRINT FOR THE PEACE RACE

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Outline of Basic Provisions
of a Treaty on
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
"... not to an arms race but to a peace race—to advance together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament has been achieved."

PRESIDENT KENNEDY
September 25, 1961
Statement by President Kennedy
Press Conference, April 18, 1962

The United States has today tabled at Geneva an outline of every basic provision of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. It provides a blueprint of our position on general and complete disarmament as well as elaboration of the nature, sequence, and timing of specific disarmament measures.

This outline of a treaty represents the most comprehensive and specific series of proposals the United States or any other country has ever made on disarmament. In addition to stating the objectives and principles which should govern agreements for disarmament, the document calls for the grouping of individual measures in three balanced and safeguarded stages. We are hopeful through the give-and-take of the conference table this plan will have a constructive influence upon the negotiations now in progress.

I want to stress that with this plan the United States is making a major effort to achieve a breakthrough on disarmament negotiations. We believe that the nations represented at Geneva have a heavy responsibility to lay the foundations for a genuinely secure and peaceful world starting through a reduction in arms.
Foreword

An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law, and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. Today, in a world riven by dangerous tensions and mistrust, the attainment of this goal necessitates continuing and patient efforts to achieve the progressive reduction of national war-making capabilities in such a manner as to increase the security of all nations. Thus, responsible arms control and disarmament proposals cannot be directed toward the attainment of unilateral political or military advantage. They must be fully responsive to the legitimate security interests of all nations.

On the basis of these considerations, President Kennedy on September 25, 1961, presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations the "United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." To provide a more precise statement of the United States approach to disarmament and the manner in which that approach should be implemented, the United States on April 18, 1962, presented to the conference of the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament, meeting in Geneva, an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." Although not a draft treaty, the "Outline" elaborates and extends the proposals of September 25 and provides in specific terms a substantial basis for the negotiation of arms control and disarmament treaty obligations.

The principal provisions of the United States Outline are described in the summary that follows. The complete text of the Outline begins on page 5.
Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on 
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

SUMMARY

Principles and Process of Disarmament

Disarmament would be implemented progressively and in a balanced manner so that at no stage could any state or group of states obtain military advantage. Compliance with obligations would be effectively verified. As national armaments were reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened.

Disarmament would be accomplished in three stages—the first to be carried out in 3 years; the second, also in 3 years; and the third, as promptly as possible within an agreed period of time. Stage I would be initiated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other agreed states. All militarily significant states would participate in Stage II; and all states possessing armaments and armed forces, in Stage III.

Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon a determination that all undertakings in the preceding stage had been carried out and that all preparations for the next stage had been made.

Disarmament Measures

A. Armaments. During Stage I, inventories of major categories of both nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments would be reduced by 30 percent. Fixed launching pads would be reduced with associated missiles. Half of the remaining inventories would be eliminated during Stage II, and final reductions would be made in Stage III. Upon the completion of Stage III, states would have at their disposal only agreed types of nonnuclear armaments for forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

Production of armaments during Stage I would be limited to agreed allowances and would be compensated for by the destruction of additional armaments to the end that reductions would not be impaired. In Stage II, production of armaments would be halted except for parts for maintenance of retained armaments. Any further produc-
tion of national armaments would be ended in Stage III except for pro-
duction of agreed types of nonnuclear armaments for internal forces.

Military research, development, and testing would be subject to
increasing limitations during the disarmament process. During Stage
III, appropriate action would be taken to insure that new scientific
discoveries and technological inventions of military significance were
not used for military purposes.

B. ARMED FORCES. Force levels of the United States and Soviet
Union would be reduced to 2.1 million at the end of Stage I. Half
of the remaining forces of these two states would be disbanded during
Stage II, and final reductions would be made in Stage III. Other
states would also progressively reduce their force levels. By the end
of Stage III, states would have at their disposal only those agreed
forces and related organizational arrangements required to maintain
internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Production of fissionable materials for use
in nuclear weapons would be halted in Stage I, and limitations would
be imposed on the production of fissionable materials for other
purposes. The availability of fissionable materials for use in nuclear
weapons would be reduced during Stage I and subsequent stages by
safeguarded transfers to nonnuclear weapons purposes.

If nuclear weapons tests had not already been halted under effective
international control, arrangements to this end would be undertaken
in Stage I. States which had manufactured nuclear weapons would
agree in Stage I not to transfer control over nuclear weapons to states
which had not manufactured them or to assist such states in their
manufacture. States which had not manufactured nuclear weapons
would refrain from seeking them. Transfers of fissionable materials
between states would be limited to peaceful purposes and would be
safeguarded.

Beginning in Stage II, nonnuclear components and assemblies of
nuclear weapons would be destroyed and limitations would be imposed
on further production or refabrication of nuclear weapons. At
the end of Stage II, remaining nuclear weapons would be registered
internationally to assist in verifying the fact that by the end of Stage
III states would not have such weapons at their disposal.

D. OUTER SPACE. The placing of weapons of mass destruction in
orbit would be prohibited in Stage I, and limitations would be imposed
on the production, stockpiling, and testing of boosters for space
vehicles. States would support increased cooperation in peaceful
uses of outer space.

E. MILITARY Bases. Reduction of military bases, wherever they
might be located, would be initiated in Stage II, and final reductions
would be made in Stage III.

F. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. Military expenditures would be re-
ported throughout the disarmament process.

Verification

The verification of disarmament would be the responsibility of an
International Disarmament Organization, which would be established
within the framework of the United Nations. Reductions of arma-
ments and armed forces would be verified at agreed locations; and
limitations on production, testing, and other specified activities, at
declared locations. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and
armed forces were not exceeded and that activities subject to limi-
tation or prohibition were not being conducted clandestinely would
be provided through arrangements which would relate the extent of
inspection at any time to the amount of disarmament being
undertaken and to the risk to the disarming states of possible viola-
tions.

Such assurance might, for example, be accomplished through
arrangements under which states would divide themselves into a
number of zones through which inspection would be progressively
extended. By the end of Stage III, when disarmament had been
completed, all parts of the territory of states would have been in-
spected.

Reduction of the Risk of War

To promote confidence and reduce the risk of war during the
disarmament process, states would, beginning in Stage I, give advance
notification of major military movements and maneuvers, establish
observation posts to report on concentrations and movements of
military forces, and insure rapid and reliable communications among
heads of governments and with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.

An International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War
would examine possible extensions and improvements of such measures
as well as additional measures to reduce the risk of war through
accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack.

Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

In Stage I, states would undertake obligations to refrain from the
threat or use of force of any type contrary to the United Nations
Charter. Throughout the three stages of disarmament, states would
use all available means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, would
seek to improve processes for this purpose, and would support mea-
sures to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain
international peace and security.

A United Nations Peace Observation Corps would be established
in Stage I, and a United Nations Peace Force, in Stage II. The
United Nations Peace Force, which would be equipped with agreed
types of armaments and would be supplied agreed manpower by
states, would be progressively strengthened until, in Stage III, it
would be fully capable of insuring international security in a disarmed
world.

Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

COMPLETE TEXT

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and
complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits
the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty.

A. Objectives

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and
   war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and
   (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the estab-
   lishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by
   effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance
   with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with
   respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:
   (a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establish-
       ments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments
       as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
   (b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological,
       and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the produc-
       tion of such weapons;
   (c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass
       destruction;
   (d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to
       organize the military efforts of states, cessation of military training,
       and closing of all military training institutions;
   (e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for general and
   complete disarmament, states would have at their disposal only those
   non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are
   agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the
   personal security of citizens.

4. To ensure that during and after implementation of general and
   complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed
   manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with
agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.

5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarmament program would be honored and observed during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

B. PRINCIPLES

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives are:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by stages to be carried out within specified time limits.

2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded.

4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

Introduction

The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United Nations of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other states as might be agreed. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.

Stage I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;

2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and

3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by thirty percent the armaments in each category listed in subparagraph b below. Except as adjustments for production would be permitted in Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b would be reduced by thirty percent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.

b. All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound
Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be similarly detailed.

2. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and these missiles not included in category (1) having a range between 1,000 kilometers and 3,000 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

3. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

4. Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free-rocket having a range of between 10 kilometers and 300 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

5. Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

6. Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

7. Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

8. Armored cars and armored personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

9. All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

10. Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battalions, cruisers, destroyers types and submarines. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

2. Method of Reduction

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date.

b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during Stage I would be carried out during each step.

c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. The production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

b. The allowances would permit limited production in each of the categories of armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments:

(1) any armament produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that category to the extent that the ten percent reduction in numbers in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved; and furthermore;

(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 15,000 kilograms or greater and of missiles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater, the destructive capability of any such armaments produced within a category would be compensated for by the destruction of sufficient armaments within that category to the end that the ten percent reduction in destructive capability as well as numbers in each of these categories in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

a. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its production in any category at a more rapid rate than required by the allowances provided in subparagraph b above, that Party would be entitled to retain existing armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its production allowance. In any such instance, any armament so retained would be compensated for in the manner set forth in subparagraph b (1) and, where applicable, b (2) above.

d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.
a. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing
measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved
questions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III
the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles
of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light
of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrange-
ments concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and
for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding
2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed
exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one percent of their
population, whichever was higher, provided that in no case would the
force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence
upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel
maintained by national governments in the following categories:

a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel
serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.

b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active
duty as fixed by national law.

c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other
forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military
mission.

3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following
manner:

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing
reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.

b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps,
each having a duration of one year. During each step, force levels
would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels
existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of
Stage I.

c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the
annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization
would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that
retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing re-
ductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including pro-
cedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employ-
ment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives
of the obligations respecting force levels.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable
materials for use in nuclear weapons.

b. This measure would be carried out in the following manner:

(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International
Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and
production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of
producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.

(2) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use
in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to
the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable
materials which were still being produced at each facility.

(3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization
would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing
limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

2. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear
Weapons

a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use
in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than
use in nuclear weapons an agreed quantity of weapon-grade U-233
from past production. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the material belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.

3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

4. Non-transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:

1. Not transfer control over any nuclear weapon to a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;

2. Not assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:

1. Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;

2. Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions

a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

b. If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

6. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. OUTER SPACE

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit

The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.

3. Notification and Pre-launch Inspection

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings.

4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization.
in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

E. MILITARY EXPENDITURES

1. Report on Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization at the end of each step of each stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include an itemization of military expenditures.

2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.

F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures:

1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Maneuvers

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and maneuvers to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed.

2. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I.

4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

5. Communications Between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their heads of government and with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary General.

6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during Stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which
would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:

a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations.

b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.

c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following:

(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided below.

(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.

(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during Stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against underdeclared movements of the objects of verification so or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified were concerned, access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out with the full cooperation of the state being inspected.

(4) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty.

4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

a. The International Disarmament Organization would have:

(1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;

(2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory powers as permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and

(3) An Administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Control Council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization.

b. The General Conference and the Control Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control Council;

b. Approving certain accessions to the Treaty;

c. Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Control Council;

d. Approving agreements between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;

e. Approving the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

f. Requesting and receiving reports from the Control Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the Control Council;
g. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;

h. Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council;

i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by the Parties to the Treaty;

k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or disarmament in general.

6. Functions of the Control Council

The Control Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator;

b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;

c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the Administrator;

d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;

e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;

f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty;

i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. Functions of the Administrator

The Administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

a. Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organization;

b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;
c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;
d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

8. Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations

a. The International Disarmament Organization, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.

b. The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization.

c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

Note: The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations.

H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Obligations Concerning the Threat or Use of Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type—including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare—contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Rules of International Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph a would also study methods of assuring states against indirect aggression or subversion.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other state, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choosing.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

5. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;
1. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;
2. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

5. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

I. TRANSITION

1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:
   a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out.
   b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and
   c. All militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I.

3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage II would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.

Stage II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage I; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

3. Reduction of Armaments

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty percent would during Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in Section A, subparagraph 1.b of Stage I by fifty percent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by sixty-five percent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty percent in Stage I.

2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of Stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in subparagraph b below, and would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by fifty percent.

b. All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

   1. Armored combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).
(2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).

(3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometers (declarations by types).

(4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).

(5) Specified types of unmanned personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).

(6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).

(7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).

(8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph 1.b and in subparagraph b above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

3. Method of Reduction

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.

1. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

b. The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

5. Additional Measures

a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production

and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:

(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty percent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II.

(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:

(1) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels twenty percent below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I.

(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during Stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other Parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.
e. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage I.

2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons:

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations.

The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

E. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In the light of the examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after Stage II.
F. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

G. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
   a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.
   b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.

2. Rules of International Conduct
   a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.
   b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure states against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. United Nations Peace Force
   The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.

4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps
   The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangements for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

5. National Legislation
   Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for noncompliance.

H. TRANSITION

1. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take place at the end of Stage II, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:
   a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out;
   b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and
   c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining at the end of Stage II whether they existed.

3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totaling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage III would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.
Stage III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II;
2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of Stage II.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
   b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied research, development, production, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all facilities for such purposes.
   b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
   c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
   b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force.

3. Other Limitations

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or military service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.
C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no nuclear weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.

E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

1. Reporting Requirement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to Stage III:

a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.

b. The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with subparagraphs above.

2. International Cooperation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international cooperation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel.

F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Improved Measures

In the light of the Stage II examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after Stage III.

2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens
those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

G. INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage III.

II. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

2. Rules of International Conduct

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it.

I. COMPLETION OF STAGE III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in Stage III had been carried out.

2. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out,
the agreed period of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods awaiting no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings still had not been carried out, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council, which would determine whether Stage III had been completed.

3. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

General Provisions Applicable to All Stages

1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. Interim Agreement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession, and Entry into Force of the Treaty

a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession, by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council.

c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by states, including the United States of America, the Union
of Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following states:

d. In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant states would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other states or authorities to accede to the Treaty.

f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.

g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depository.

4. Finance

a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organisation, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organisation's expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.

b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organisation.

5. Authentic Texts

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.
Do you believe that we can retain our sovereignty without an armed force to sustain it?
Read this diagram across. It came from the "Second Annual Report to Congress". You are now in the last stage: Stage III. It gives proof that when you no longer have any national armed forces, you will be policed by military forces. Soldiers from many lands have already been trained to occupy this country.
NO ARMY  NO NAVY  NO AIR FORCE

(CAND NO GUNS FOR THE CITIZENS)

Catch on!
You are being sold out!

U.S. THREE-STAGE DISARMAMENT PLAN

STAGE I
US
USSR

PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY

STAGE II
US
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

STAGE III
UN
UN


New World Order

As you read the above diagram, across the span of the three helmets on a horizontal plane, notice that nations go through a reduction in all three stages until there are 2-2-2-0 armed forces in the third stage while the Peacekeeping Machinery becomes increasingly strengthened for COMMAND under the Security Council of the COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED United Nations. It is planned that the United States shall be permanently WITHOUT AN ARMY, A NAVY AND AN AIR FORCE. The Internal Security Forces that are to be assigned the duty of keeping order MAY OR MAY NOT be U.S. citizens. Martial rule shall prevail throughout the United States. Long guns and collector's items MUST also be banned so that the Internal Security Forces CANNOT BE CHALLENGED BY THE CITIZENS. Consult your local librarian or your U.S. Congressman for a copy of these important documents which show how the United States' military might is to be TRANSFERRED to INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

Tell your congressman that THIS IS AGAINST THE LAW. Tell him to repeal Public Law 87-297 and all the Amendments to that law.
THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

U.S. THREE-STAGE DISARMAMENT PLAN

STAGE I

STAGE II

STAGE III

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY

(s) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful use;

Armed forces would be cut to a level of 2,100,000 men each for the Soviet Union and United States in the first stage, to 1,000,000 in the second stage, and to zero, except for small internal security and U.N. Peace Force contingents, in the third. Similar reductions in all of the foregoing categories would also have to be applied to other militarily significant powers in the second stage and to all states in the third stage.
FREEDOM FROM WAR
THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

- The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
- The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force.

ZERO MILITARY

Armed forces would be cut to a level of 2,100,000 men each for the Soviet Union and United States in the first stage, to 1,050,000 in the second stage, and to zero, except for small internal security and U.N. Peace Force contingents, in the third. Similar reductions in all of the foregoing categories would also have to be applied to other militarily significant powers in the second stage and to all states in the third stage.

ACTION RECOMMENDED: Visit or call your state representatives and protest the state's cooperation in these acts to overthrow our republic and the Constitution of the United States. A military defense is an essential to the American Union and the preservation of our Constitutional Compact and the Bill of Rights. The federal government cannot proceed without the help of the states.

Sec. 3. As used in this Act—
(a) The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" mean the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination, of armed forces and armaments of all kinds under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such agreement to establish an effective system of international control, or to create and strengthen international organizations for the maintenance of peace.

TITHE III SEC. 201
(a) The detection, identification, inspection, monitoring, limitation, reduction, control, and elimination of armed forces and armaments, including thermonuclear, nuclear, missile, conventional, bacteriological, chemical, and radiological weapons.
This is an update to the parent document, Public Law 87-297.

The appropriations to keep financing the "general and complete disarmament program" are allocated every two years.

Here is the one done in December of 1989. It was only 3 -1/2 pages in all!

How could the Congress miss the section that is highlighted?

The voting record is on the next page.
George H. Bush signed this law in 1989 which is an Amendment to the General and Complete Disarmament Law (P.L. 89-297). Look on back to see who voted in favor of it!
A vote for Public Law 101-216 is a vote to support its parent document, Public Law 87-297. This is a clear-cut violation of the oath of office. Elimination of the nation's common defense destroys the sovereignty of the nation and obsoletes its Constitution!

Republicans and Democrats! Is there a dime's worth of difference? Public Law 101-216 was only a 3 page bill! It was no big job to find the definition of disarmament which was plainly in view, yet Congress voted to continue financing the giving away of our armed forces to the United Nations.

Look closely at the names of the congressmen who voted to support Public Law 101-216. It passed the Senate by voice vote.

This law divests us of all of our armed forces! That means No Army! No Navy! No Air Force! No National Guard!

George H. W. Bush! You signed this into law! As president neither you nor the Congress were vested with the power to deprive this nation of its military.

The Clerk announced the following BILL:

On this vote:

Mr. Murphy led, with Mr. Quillen against. Messrs. KYL, RATCLIF, ASPIN, and KOLBE changed their vote from 'yes' to 'nay.'

So the bill was passed.

The result of this vote was announced as above recorded.
Look over this list to see who voted to eliminate the right to have armed forces to protect us, and to transfer them to the communists who dominate the United Nations. Many of the members of this House of Representatives are still in office posing as "conservatives".
Perhaps, you can visualize what can happen when you are left completely unprotected.
Public Law 87-297 was signed into "law" for the United States by Pres. John F. Kennedy.

Public Law 101-216 was signed into "law" for the United States by Pres. George Bush.

This is the speech that was delivered before the United Nations by John F. Kennedy on September 25, 1961. Check back on Public Law 87-297 and note that the very next day after Kennedy's speech, the Congress signed it into law!