



**FOR  
THE  
DOUBTER:  
A  
TOUR  
WITH  
UNCLE SAM!**

# THIS IS ME, BERNADINE SMITH



I put this binder together to prove to the "Doubting Thomases" that something very serious is going on in this country! The pages are full up with special bona fide documents, and different articles to support the fact that a "new world order" is shaping up that will take away your Constitutional government and put you under a military government!



I used to take people on a tour. Then one day I decided to ask Uncle Sam if he would join me in this effort, and he said he would! He was willing to become the tour guide. He will be with us in just a few minutes. My job is to prepare you

for the tour. So first, I must prove to you that it is possible for something to exist that you cannot see! That will make you appreciate the tour better!

I do a little lecture through the next 10 pages and then I introduce you to your tour guide, Uncle Sam! He happens to be the real Uncle Sam! Make no mistake about that! He knows his stuff!

He will zip in and out through the pages of the tour. Sometimes he says a lot, and sometimes he says just a little to make you understand the value of what you are looking at! When he is done, I will come back and wind up the tour with the article I wrote called: "To Sink or Swim."

You may want to read that before you start the tour as it wraps the whole thing up, and you get the overall picture in a hurry, but if you are new to this subject, you'd better stay with Uncle Sam's part of the tour first, because he teaches you from scratch and he goes slowly. After that, I will be back!


See ya'!



Give up??

# Hidden Pictures






Sam will be showing you copies of authentic government documents. Access to this information has been denied to you. There are people out there that want to dissolve your constitutional system. Look for Sam as he darts in and out of the pages.

## AN APPEAL TO YOUR FAIRNESS IS BEING MADE

Dear Fellow American:

← On the opposite page is a picture engineered to trick you! The picture contains 12 objects, all of which are hidden right before your eyes, which at first glance, you didn't see, did you? Most likely -- you would not have noticed all 12 of the following objects -- unless their existence had been told to you:

Did you see these Hidden Objects on the opposite page?



In all fairness, will you not agree that there is a possibility that certain *political arrangements* have been developed that could have escaped your sight and evaluation? Going on the basis that you are a fair person, (1) willing to adjust your thinking to new information which previously has been denied you, and (2) willing to re-evaluate the circumstances presented herein, this compilation has been prepared for your consideration.

Continued

Evil goals that you would not knowingly approve of, and which are altering the integrity and existence of our system of government, are hidden or are being passed off as "normal" laudable objectives. By bringing the *whole* picture into conformity, the fog is lifted for a clear understanding of the strange happenings in government.

There is no other reason for the arduous task involved in preparation of this compilation other than to warn fellow Americans of their true predicament. This compilation presents bona fide data taken from original sources. It is not simply by accident that so much highly irregular legislation and portentous treaties are being passed!

Americans are being beguiled by talk show hosts who keep the facts from them or twist facts to keep the public uninformed. Many talk show hosts are also used as disinformation agents, or "change agents". These are professional liars and are hired to be apologists for obvious mistakes of leading *new world order* (globalist) public officials.

Unfortunately, there are too many Americans who do not understand the proper workings of their own government; therefore, they are not able to recognize when the system is being attacked and seriously undermined. For the safety and endurance of our state and nation, we feel that it is incumbent upon those who are fair-minded and responsible persons to give this evidence its rightful consideration.

Please do your part to preserve the American heritage for those who are too young to understand or to guard against the workings of men with conniving minds. It is the duty of real Americans to guard the young against becoming victims of political oppressors.

Respectfully,

SECOND AMENDMENT COMMITTEE



Bernadine Smith, National Director

**It has been  
demonstrated to you**

**that some things**

**can be hidden**

**from you,**



**and yet**

**truly are**

**in your full view**

**once you have been**

**alerted**

**to their presence!**

**The documents that follow are  
exact copies of authenticated  
originals.**



**They have been reproduced  
so that you can decide  
on your own  
whether or not  
something harmful is being  
done by the alterations  
being made to our  
Constitutional system of  
government.**

**It is hoped that you will detect  
the pattern and grasp  
the relationship of the parts,  
and thereby see the full  
picture.**



Samuel B. Pettengill

Samuel B. Pettengill,  
who represented  
Indiana's 3rd Congressional  
District in the 1930's  
published a book in 1940  
which was entitled:

SMOKE-SCREEN.

In SMOKE-SCREEN  
Pettengill warned:

"The progress will be gradual, but the end  
inevitable. There will be no sudden coup d'etat.  
The march will be step by step, and by  
muffled tread. It will move under the  
smoke-screen  
of laudable "objectives" to its hidden goal.  
That goal is National Socialism."



Well said, Mr. Pettengill!

Before the Congress was taken over by quidlings - we used to have some fine - really true patriots in office - who tried to wake up the people as to what was going on! Besides Samuel Pettengill, there was William E. Jenner, James Du, Larry McDonald, John Rarick,

Usher Burdick, John Ashbrook, etc.


but the communists took more open control of our movies, radios, news-papers, and TV, after World War II. Our schools and churches also fell victim to those evil policies and our people have been propagandized. People are still being denied the facts about the socialist/communist takeover of America. Now, please turn the page.



**People don't want to believe  
because  
public officials don't report  
these issues  
in the usual news media.**

**The news media  
was bought up in the  
'50's, '60's, and '70's.**

**The news is controlled and  
filtered.**



## Why is it that people don't believe when you tell them what is happening?

Even though adequate proof is at their disposal, the *uninformed* often choose not to believe nor to respect the well-meaning informant who had only intended to awaken his fellow citizens.

Each disbelieving person has to undergo a traumatic reaction when irrefutable documents are lain before him revealing the plan to transfer our total armed forces on a permanent basis to the communists who operate the United Nations!<sup>1</sup>

The people's innocent response to being told of such calamitous betrayals is: "It doesn't sound real!" After a while, they ask "Is this really true?"

Many choose to rationalize and disbelieve the alarms set off by their fellow citizens! "If it were true," they rationalize, "the newspapers would have printed articles about it!"

We must agree: It doesn't seem real that certain public officials would betray us, but the truth is that they have betrayed us! In order to import a peaceful way in time to save the country and our American Heritage, we must gain the support of loyal public officials actively holding office. If they come forward and tell of the sedition within government, they will have instant believers!

With the credibility public officials have, they can much more readily break into the news and thus awaken the sleeping giant! In turn, this will broaden the base of support so necessary for a calm solution.

<sup>1</sup> This is the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament which also includes the closing of U.S. defense plants, military bases, and prohibiting law abiding people from possessing firearms. This law has been passed just to stand in U.S. Code books under Title 22, Section 2350, etc.




John Swinton, one of the best loved newspaper men in the United States, the Dean of his profession, when asked for a toast before the New York Press Club, is quoted as saying:

"There is no such thing, at this date of the world's history, in America, as an independent press. You know it and I know it.

There is not one of you who dares to write your honest opinions, and if you did, you know beforehand that it would never appear in print. I am paid \$150.00 a week for keeping my honest opinion out of the paper I am connected with. Others of you are paid similar salaries for similar things, and any of you who would be so foolish as to write honest opinions would be out on the streets looking for another job. If I allowed my honest opinions to appear in one issue of my paper, before twenty-four hours my occupation would be gone.

The business of the journalists is to destroy the truth: to lie outright; to pervert, to vilify; to fawn at the feet of mammon and to sell his country and his race for his daily bread, you know it and I know it, and what folly is this toasting an independent press.

We are the tools and vassals of rich men behind the scenes. We are the jumping-jacks -- they pull the strings and we dance-- our talents, our possibilities and our lives are all the property of other men. We are intellectual prostitutes."



Well, friend, this is where I leave you. From here on, Uncle Sam takes over. He used to work 100% of the time, but now he is only working part time, you know! He says only 'about 10% of the time' is all! That's real sad, because

the other 90% of the time they try to hide him in a closet.

But he won't go! He refuses! He wants everybody to

know that he loves to work for the people, and he wants

to be around helping them. Well, he is ready now to

show you lots of papers and documents. He calls it his

"evidence of mistreatment" and he is hanging on to the

stuff. He says there will be a time when it will all come

in handy. That will be Sam's BIG DAY! Maybe you

can help him to get back on full time work. If so, leave

your name and number. For now, be attentive and

considerate. I'll pick you back up later... Bernadine



**Are you ready  
for the Tour  
with the real Uncle Sam?**

**YES,  
I AM THE REAL UNCLE SAM.**



**I REPRESENT THE TRUE LAW  
OF THIS NATION.**

**I AM THE SPIRIT OF THE  
CONSTITUTION.**

**I WILL SHOW YOU WHAT IS  
HAPPENING TO YOU AND ME.**

**MAN HAS A RIGHT TO LIMIT THE  
POWER  
THAT MAN CAN EXERCISE  
OVER HIS FELLOW MAN.**



**I WAS NOT INSTITUTED TO BE A  
DEMOCRACY.**

**I STAND FOR A REPUBLIC.**

**PUBLIC OFFICIALS HAVE TAKEN ON  
SELF-ENDOWED POWERS  
WHICH THE PEOPLE HAVE NEVER  
CONSENTED TO ALLOW THEM.**



**THERE HAS BEEN NO  
“CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED”  
FOR THE THINGS YOU WILL  
SEE ON THIS TOUR.  
THESE ARE VIOLATIONS OF THE  
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.**

# **WHAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO SEE IS NOT THEORY!**




**YOU ARE LOOKING AT  
AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS  
THAT EXPOSE A PROGRAM  
THAT HAS BEEN  
IMPLEMENTED AND ON-  
GOING EVER SINCE IT WAS  
SIGNED INTO “LAW” IN  
1961.**



# **SOMEONE HAS TO ANSWER FOR THIS!**

Congress was never authorized to transfer over our armed forces to a foreign power!



**Having an armed force to protect your country  
is one of your most precious possessions.**



You'll find  
PL 87-297  
in U.S. Code  
books in  
your library.

**It protects your borders,  
your Constitution,  
your Bill of Rights,  
your land, your family,  
and your personal life.**

**Do you agree that we should not be  
eliminating our armed forces? Please  
take a look at this official law →  
signed in 1961 by John F. Kennedy,  
calling for the United States  
to eliminate its armed forces.**

**It calls for general and complete disarmament  
including weapons of all kinds in the hands  
of the law-abiding people!**

**How safe will you be then?**

# THIS IS AN ACTUAL LAW. IT IS CALLED PUBLIC LAW 87-297.



Public Law 87-297  
87th Congress, H. R. 9118  
September 26, 1961

## An Act

P.L. 87-297, 83 Stat.

To establish a United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the  
United States of America in Congress assembled,*

### TITLE I—SHORT TITLE, PURPOSE, AND DEFINITIONS

#### SIMPLY TITLE.

Sec. 1. This Act may be cited as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Act".

Arms Control  
and Disarm-  
ment Act.

#### PURPOSE:

Sec. 2. An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. It is the purpose of this Act to provide impetus toward this goal by creating a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament.



Arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole. The formulation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy in a manner which will promote the national security can best be insured by a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field. This organization must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the executive branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy.

This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based. It must be able to carry out the following primary functions:

- (a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation;
- (b) The preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;
- (c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and
- (d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

#### DEFINITIONS

Sec. 3. As used in this Act—

- (a) The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" mean the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination, of armed forces and armaments of all kinds under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement to establish an effective system of inter-



10-201 C

## YOU CAN REMOVE IT AND INSPECT IT.



In the present paper the authors wish to extend the results of previous studies of the

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT ON THE GROWTH OF COTTON

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Sectores I, Tercer Andén que se ubica en la Avenida Central y Calle Díaz Suárez.

America's armed and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole. The formulation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy is a matter which will require a clear national security can best be assured by a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field. This organization must have such a position within the Government that it can promptly advise the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy.

This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, diplomatic, realistic, arms control, and disarmament advice required.

(a) The individual, singular, and confidential nature of research that requires a waiver of informed consent; (b) The individual, singular, and confidential nature of research that requires a waiver of informed consent; and (c) The individual, singular, and confidential nature of research that requires a waiver of informed consent.

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(a) The term "arms control" and "disarmament" mean the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination of arms forces and armaments of all kinds under international agreement including the disarmament of nuclear weapons.

national control, or to create and strengthen international agreements for the maintenance of peace.

(b) The term "Government agency," means any executive department, commission, corporation, authority, independent establishment, corporation wholly or partly owned by the United States which is an instrumentality of the United States, or any bureau, bureau, division, service, office, office, authority, administration, or other establishment in the executive branch of Government.

(c) The term "Agency" means the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

## TITLE II—ORGANIZATION

**ARMED FORCES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY**

### ARMED FORCES

Sec. 10. The Agency shall be headed by a Director, who shall serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters. In carrying out his duties under this Act the Director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters, as defined in this Act. He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 per annum.

### ARMED FORCES

Sec. 11. A Deputy Director of the Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 per annum. The Deputy Director shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Director may prescribe. He shall act for, and assume the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability or during a vacancy in said office.

### ARMED FORCES, ARMS CONTROLS

Sec. 12. The Director, under the direction of the Secretary of State, may establish within the Agency such bureaus, offices, and divisions as he may determine to be necessary to discharge his responsibilities under this Act, including, but not limited to, an Office of the General Counsel.

### ARMED FORCES, ARMS CONTROLS

Sec. 13. The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may appoint a General Advisory Committee of not to exceed fifteen members to advise the Director on arms control and disarmament policy and activities. The President shall designate one of the members as Chairman. The members of the committee may receive the compensation and reimbursement for expenses specified for

consultants by section 11(d) of this Act. The committee shall meet at least twice each year. It shall from time to time advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Director on arms control and disarmament matters affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace.

## TITLE III—FUNCTIONS

### ARMED FORCES

Sec. 14. The Director is authorized and directed to exercise his powers in such manner as to insure the acquisition of a fund of theoretical and practical knowledge concerning disarmament. To this end, the Director is authorized and directed, under the direction of the President, (1) to insure the conduct of research, development, and other studies in the field of arms control and disarmament; (2) to make arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and grants) for the conduct of research, development, and other studies in the field of arms control and disarmament by private or public institutions or persons; and (3) to coordinate the research, development, and other studies conducted in the field of arms control and disarmament by or for other Government agencies in accordance with procedures established under section 14 of this Act. In carrying out his responsibilities under this Act, the Director shall, to the maximum extent feasible, make full use of available facilities, Government and private. The authority of the Director with respect to research, development, and other studies shall be limited to participation in the following studies as they relate to arms control and disarmament:

(1) the economic, technological, and scientific implications resulting from reductions, control, and elimination of armed forces and armaments, including thermonuclear, nuclear, missile, conventional, bacteriological, chemical, and radiological weapons;

(2) the technical and operational systems of detecting, identifying, locating, and monitoring of arms of war, disarmament, and other weapons;

(3) the analysis of national budgets, levels of industrial production, and economic indicators to determine the amounts spent by various countries for armaments;

(4) the control, reduction, and elimination of armed forces and armaments in space, in areas on and beneath the earth's surface, and in underwater regions;

(5) the structures and operations of international control and other organizations useful for arms control and disarmament;

(6) the training of scientists, technicians, and other personnel for running the control system which may be created by international agreements concerning armaments;

(7) the production and elimination of the dangers of war resulting from accidents, misinterpretation, or possible surprise attack, including both land and improvements in the methods of communication between nations;

(8) the economic and political consequences of arms control and disarmament including the problems of readjustment arising in industry and the reallocation of national resources;

(9) the arms control and disarmament implications of foreign aid and national security policies of the United States with a view to a better understanding of the significance of such policies for the achievement of arms control and disarmament;

(10) the national security and foreign policy implications of arms control and disarmament proposals with a view to a better understanding of the effect of such proposals upon national security and foreign policy;

(b) methods for the maintenance of peace and security during different stages of arms control and disarmament;

(i) The scientific, economic, political, legal, social, psychological, military, and technological factors related to the prevention of war will give a rise to a better understanding of how the framework of existing peace may be stabilized;

(iii) such related problems as the Director may determine to be in need of research, development, or study in order to carry out the functions of [institutes]

10

**Sec. 10.** All research within the United States contracted for, sponsored, compensated, or authorized under authority of this Act, shall be provided for in such manner that all information as to new products, processes, patents, and other developments resulting from such research developed by Government expenditures will (with such exceptions and qualifications, if any, as the Director may find to be necessary in the public interest) be available to the general public. This subsection shall not be construed so as to deprive the owner of any basic record patent relating thereto of the right to sue for infringement.

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**Sec. 33.** The Director is authorized and directed to present for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies as the President may determine, recommendations concerning United States armament and disarmament policy: Provided, however, That no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or instruments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.

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and the distribution of the  $\text{Li}^{+}$  ions in the polymer. The distribution of the  $\text{Li}^{+}$  ions in the polymer is determined by the following equation:

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(c) the Director is authorized (1) to template plans and make preparations for the establishment, operation, and handling of inspection and control systems which may become part of the United States arms control and disarmament activities, and (2) as authorized by law, to put into effect, direct, or otherwise assume United States responsibility for such systems.

of transportation and for whom it less of subsidies while away from their homes or regular places of business, as authorized by section 5 of said Act, is suspended (1 U.S.C. 75-2): ~~section~~, ~~III.~~ That no such ~~subsidy~~ shall be applied for more than one hundred days in any fiscal year unless the President certifies that employment of such individual in excess of such number of days is necessary in the national interest; ~~and~~ ~~pro-~~ ~~tection~~ ~~of~~ ~~public~~ ~~purposes~~. ~~This~~ ~~section~~ ~~shall~~ ~~remain~~ ~~in~~ ~~force~~ ~~for~~ ~~one~~ ~~year~~.

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Sec. 14. The President is authorized to establish procedures to (1) assure cooperation, consultation, and a continuing exchange of information between the Agency and the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and other Federal Government agencies, in all significant aspects of United States arms control and disarmament policy and related matters including current and prospective policies, plans, and programs; (2) resolve differences of opinion between the Director and such other agency which cannot be resolved through consultation, and (3) provide for presentation to the President of recommendations of the Director with respect to such differences, when such differences involve major nations of policy and cannot be resolved through consultation.

THE NEW TESTAMENT

Sec. II. In the performance of his functions, the Director is authorized to—

(6) actions or authority, the name and personnel, equipment, or facilities of any other Government agency, with the consent of the agency concerned, to perform such functions on behalf of this Agency as may appear practicable. It is the intent of this section that the Director may upon the Department of State for general administrative services in the United States and abroad to the extent agreed upon the Secretary of State and the Director. Any Government agency is authorized, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to transfer to or receive from the Director, without reimbursement, supplies and equipment either than administrative supplies or equipment. Transfer or receipt of excess property shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act.

(b) present orders and employees holding witness for the Agency in accordance with the Classification Act of 1949, it shall

(7) *Leviathan* is the title of a political treatise by Thomas Hobbes, published in 1651. It is a defense of the absolute power of the state over its subjects. The book is divided into two main parts: the first part discusses the nature of the state and the second part discusses the relationship between the state and its subjects. The book has been widely influential in political thought and has been cited by many other writers, including John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.

authorised by resolution 5 of the Act of Congress, 1862, at rates not to exceed \$100 per ton for navigation, and as much as \$250, to pay the expenses of classified, general expenses of navigation, including transportation and port charges in case of a barge or vessel, and by section 5 of said Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. Title 5): 1862, 1871.

19 Stat. 937.  
19 Stat. 937.

(e) making available of continuing ability without compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 139(e) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 1160), and regulations issued thereunder;

(f) establishing advisory boards or committees with and make recommendations to the Director on United States arms control and disarmament policy and activities. The members of such boards may receive the compensation and reimbursement for expenses provided for individuals by section 11(d) of this Act;

(g) delegating, as appropriate, to the Deputy Director or other officers of the Agency, any authority conferred upon the Director by the provisions of this Act; and

(h) making, promulgating, issuing, revising, and amending such rules and regulations as may be necessary or desirable in the exercise of any authority conferred upon the Director by the provisions of this Act.

**PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE STATE DEPARTMENT**

Sec. 42. The Secretary of State may authorize the Director to administer, with respect to Foreign Service Reserve officers and Foreign Service Staff officers and employees appointed or employed for the Agency, the following authority:

(1) The authority contained in the Secretary of State under the Foreign Service Act of 1949, as amended, (2) the authority available in the Secretary under any other provision of law pertaining specifically, or generally, applicable to such officers or employees, and (3) the authority of the Board of Foreign Service pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1949, as amended.

#### CONTRACTS OR CONTRACTURES

Sec. 43. The President may, in addition, except sections of the Director from the provisions of law relating to contracts or expenditures of Government funds, characterize by him or her that such action is essential in the interest of United States arms control and disarmament and security policy.

#### CONTRACT OR CONTRACTURE AND RELATED COMPENSATION LAWS

Sec. 44. The members of the General Advisory Committee created by section 30 of this Act, and the members of the advisory boards, the contractors, and the individuals of outstanding ability employed without compensation, all of which are provided in section 41 of this Act, may serve as such without regard to the provisions of sections 351, 352, 354, or 354 of title 11 of the United States Government Organization Act of the Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. 198), or of any other Federal law imposing restrictions, requirements, or penalties in relation to the employment of individuals, the performance of services, or the payment or receipt of compensation in connection with any claim, proceeding, or matter in relating to the United States Government, except so far as such provisions of law may prohibit any such individual from receiving compensation from a source other than a non-governmental institution in respect of any particular matter in which the Agency is directly interested. You shall such service be rendered as employee or holding of office or holding of position, being such individual within the provisions of section 11 of the Civil Service System Act of 1947 (5 U.S.C. 1940), section 373 of the Act of June 10, 1949, as amended (5 U.S.C. 1940), or any other Federal law limiting the employment of retired officers or employees of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or a contractor or subcontractor,

#### SECURITY INFORMATION

Sec. 45. (a) The Director shall establish such security and loyalty requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as he deems necessary in the interest of the national security and to carry out the provisions of this Act. The Director shall arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of full-fledged background security and loyalty investigation of all the Agency's officers, employees, consultants, persons detailed from other Government agencies, members of its General Advisory Committee, advisory board, contractors and subcontractors, and their agents and employees, actual or prospective. In the course of the investigation disclosure information indicating that the person investigated may be or may become a security risk or may be of doubtful loyalty, the report of the investigation shall be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full-fledged investigation. The final results of all such investigations shall be turned over to the Director for final determination. No person shall be permitted to enter on duty at such an officer, employee, consultant, or member of advisory committee or board, or pursuant to any such duty, and no contractor, subcontractor, or officer, or employee thereof, shall be permitted to have access to any classified information, until he shall have been investigated in accordance with this subsection and the report of such investigation made to the Director, and the Director shall have determined that such person is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty. Classified officials with respect to the security clearance of persons within any category referred to in this subsection shall not be less stringent, and the investigation of such persons for such purpose shall not be less thorough or complete, than in the case of such classes of persons in a corresponding category under the highest security restrictions with respect to persons having no security clearance.

(b) The Atomic Energy Commission may authorise any of its employees, or employees of any contractor, prospective contractor, licensee, or prospective subcontractor, to have access to Restricted Data by the Atomic Energy Commission under section 31(a) of title 42, as permit it may, the Director of any officer, employee, consultant, person detailed from other Government agencies, member of the General Advisory Council, or of an advisory board established pursuant to section 41(1), contractor, subcontractor, prospective contractor, or prospective sub-contractor, or officer or employee of such contractor, subcontractor, prospective contractor, or prospective subcontractor, so long as section 10 of the Restricted Data which is required in the performance of his duties and as specified by the Director, but only if (1) the Atomic Energy Commission has determined, in accordance with the established procedures and standards of the Agency, an adequate and reasonable security programme and standards of the Commission, that permitting such individual to have access to such Restricted Data will not unduly impair the common defense and security, and (2) the Atomic Energy Commission finds that the established personnel and other security procedures and standards of the Agency are adequate and reasonably conformity to the standards established by the Atomic Energy Commission under section 31(a) of title 42, including those for interim clearance in subsection (b) thereof. Any individual granted access to such Restricted Data pursuant to his subsection may exchange such data, with any individual who (A) is an officer or employee of the Department of Defense, or any department or agency thereof, or a member of the Armed Forces, or an officer or employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or a contractor or subcontractor,

Sec. 46. (a) The Director shall establish such security and loyalty requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as he deems necessary in the interest of the national security and to carry out the provisions of this Act. The Director shall arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of full-fledged background security and loyalty investigation of all the Agency's officers, employees, consultants, persons detailed from other Government agencies, members of its General Advisory Committee, advisory board, contractors and subcontractors, and their agents and employees, actual or prospective. In the course of the investigation disclosure information indicating that the person investigated may be or may become a security risk or may be of doubtful loyalty, the report of the investigation shall be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full-fledged investigation. The final results of all such investigations shall be turned over to the Director for final determination. No person shall be permitted to enter on duty at such an officer, employee, consultant, or member of advisory committee or board, or pursuant to any such duty, and no contractor, subcontractor, or officer, or employee thereof, shall be permitted to have access to any classified information, until he shall have been investigated in accordance with this subsection and the report of such investigation made to the Director, and the Director shall have determined that such person is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty. Classified officials with respect to the security clearance of persons within any category referred to in this subsection shall not be less stringent, and the investigation of such persons for such purpose shall not be less thorough or complete, than in the case of such classes of persons in a corresponding category under the highest security restrictions with respect to persons having no security clearance.

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19 Stat. 937.  
19 Stat. 937.  
19 Stat. 937.

use of any such department, agency, or armed force, or an officer or employee of any such contractor or subcontractor, and (B) has been authorized to have access to Restricted Data under the provisions of sections 1163 or 1165 of title 42.

**Contractor records, assets.**

Sec. 46. No amounts appropriated for the purposes of this Act shall be available for payment under any contract with the Director, negotiated without advertising, except contracts with any foreign government, international organization or any agency thereof, unless such contract includes a clause to the effect that the Comptroller General of the United States or one of his duly authorized representatives shall, with the separation of these sums after final payment, have access to and the right to examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of, and implementing transactions related to such contractor or subcontractor, provided, however, that no amounts so appropriated shall be available for payment under such contracts which includes any provision requiring us with the General Accounting Office of any transaction under such contract and provider further. That nothing in this section shall preclude the earlier disengagement of contractor and subcontractor records in accordance with record disposal schedules agreed upon between the Director and the General Accounting Office.

**Retention or retention and destruction to answer**

Sec. 47. (a) The United States Disarmament Administration, together with its records, property, personnel, and funds, is hereby transferred to the Agency. The appropriations and unexpended balance of appropriations transferred pursuant to this subsection shall be available for expenditure for any and all objects of expense more authorized by this Act, without regard to the requirements of appropriations under section 606 of this Act.  
 (b) The President, by Executive order, may transfer to the Director any authority or facilities of any Government agency which relate primarily to arms control and disarmament. In connection with any such transfer, the President may under this section or other applicable authority, provide for appropriate transfers of records, property, civilian personnel, and funds. No transfer shall be made under this subsection until (1) a full and complete report concerning the nature and effect of such proposed transfer has been transmitted by the President to the Congress, and (2) the long period of sixty calendar days of regular session of the Congress following the date of receipt of such report by the Congress has expired without adoption by either House of the Congress of a resolution directing that such transfer not favor such transfer. The procedures prescribed in title II of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 shall apply to any such resolution.

**Use of funds**

Sec. 48. Appropriations made to the Director for the purposes of this Act, and transfer of funds to him by other Government agencies for such purposes, shall be available to him to exercise any authority granted him by this Act, including, without limitation, expenses of printing and mailing without regard to the provisions of section 11 of the Act of March 1, 1890 (44 U.S.C. 111) if purchased or hired of any passenger motor vehicle for the official use of the Director without fee.

10 Stat. 888  
10 Stat. 888  
10 Stat. 888

United States Code, entertainment and official entertainments to the extent authorized by appropriation; expenditures for training and study; expenditures in connection with participation in international conferences for the purposes of this Act; and expenses in connection with travel of personnel outside the United States, including transportation expenses of dependents, household goods, and incidental effects, and expenses authorized by the Foreign Service Act of 1944, as of that date, 60 Stat. 1051 note.

**Amendments**


Sec. 49. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated not to exceed \$10,000,000 to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act.  
 (b) Funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be allocated or transferred to any agency for carrying out the purposes of this Act. Such funds shall be available for obligation and expenditure in accordance with authority granted in this Act, or under authority given applying the authority of this section to which such funds are allocated or transferred.

**Motion to concur**

Sec. 50. The Director shall submit to the President, for transmission to the Congress, not later than January 31 of each year, a report concerning activities of the Agency.

Approved September 26, 1961. 1245 p.m.

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are shown on the right.**



THE  
UNITED STATES  
PROGRAM FOR  
GENERAL AND  
COMPLETE  
DISARMAMENT  
IN A PEACEFUL  
WORLD

**FREEDOM  
FROM  
WAR**



**FREEDOM  
FROM  
WAR**



**THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM  
FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE  
DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL  
WORLD**

*DEPARTMENT OF STATE*

## **Introduction**

*The revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences has produced a crisis in human history. In order to overcome the danger of nuclear war now confronting mankind, the United States has introduced at the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations a Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.*

This new program provides for the progressive reduction of the war-making capabilities of nations and the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions to settle disputes and maintain the peace. It sets forth a series of comprehensive measures which can and should be taken in order to bring about a world in which there will be freedom from war and security for all states. It is based on three principles deemed essential to the achievement of practical progress in the disarmament field:

### **DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7477**

*Disarmament Series 3*

*Revised September 1961*

*Office of Public Services*

**MINISTRY OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D. C. Price 10 cents*

A strenuous and uninterrupted effort must be made toward the goal of general and complete disarmament; at the same time, it is important that specific measures be put into effect as soon as possible.

**Second, all disarmament efforts must be subject to effective international controls.**

The control organization must have the manpower, facilities, and effectiveness to assure that limitations or reductions take place as agreed. It must also be able to certify to all states that retained forces and armaments do not exceed those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process.

#### **This, adequate peace-keeping machinery must be established:**

There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.

There follows a summary of the principal provisions of the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. The full text of the program is contained in an appendix to this pamphlet.

## **FREEDOM FROM WAR**

### **THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD**

#### **Summary**

#### **DISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVES**

The overall goal of the United States is a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states abiding to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world which has achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control; and a world in which adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

In order to make possible the achievement of that goal, the program sets forth the following specific objectives toward which nations should direct their efforts:

- The disbanding of all national armed forces and the production of their reestablishment in any form whatever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;
- The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and

- the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;
- The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations;
- The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.

### **TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATES**

The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved. To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form part of the total program.

### **GOVERNING PRINCIPLES**

The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:

- As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to insure international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;
- Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;
- Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and
- Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state.

### **DISARMAMENT STAGES**

The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take place in three stages and for the ultimate non-aggression and international imitations.

#### **FIRST STAGE**

The first stage contains measures which would significantly reduce the capabilities of nations to wage

aggressive war. Implementation of this stage would mean that:

- The nuclear threat would be reduced.

All states would have adhered to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be stopped and quantities of such materials from past production would be converted to non-weapons uses.

States owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and would not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.

States not owning nuclear weapons would not mass produce them or attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states.

A Commission of Experts would be established to report on the feasibility and means for the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

- Strategic delivery vehicles would be reduced.

Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and weapons designed to carry such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.

- Arms and armed forces would be reduced.

The armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding that amount for other militarily significant states); levels of armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be limited. An Experts Commission would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

- Peaceful use of outer space would be promoted.

The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction would be prohibited. States would give advance notification of space vehicle and missile launches.

- U.N. peacekeeping powers would be strengthened.

Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.

- An International Disarmament Organization would be established for effective verification of the disarmament programs.

Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.

- It would certify to all states that agreed reductions have taken place and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels.

It would determine the transition from one stage to the next.

- States would be committed to other measures to reduce international tension and to protect against the chance of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack.

States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

States would be committed to give advance notice of major military movements which might cause alarm; observation posts would be established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

- Establishment of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes under the United Nations;
- Establishment of a permanent international peace force within the United Nations;
- Depending on the findings of an Experts Commission, a ban in the production of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons and a reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses;
- On the basis of the findings of an Experts Committee, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons;
- The dismantling of the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and
- The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament Organisations to enable it to study the steps taken in Stage II and to determine the transition to Stage III.

### THIRD STAGE

During the third stage of the program, the states of the world, building on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal of a world in which:

- States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.

- The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.
- The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

- The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

## Appendix

### DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR CIVILIAN AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT WANT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Nations of the world,

Concerned at the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can live freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;

Desire their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the methods of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;

Set forth in the object of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a) The abolishing of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatever other than those required to protect internal order and his contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;

(d) The institution of effective means for the establishment of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

Call on the negotiating states:

(a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to commence their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;

(b) To this end to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;

(c) Also to act—without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program—agreements on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program;

Agree that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages comprising balanced, phased and orderly measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time;

(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations on reduction take place but also that reduced armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage;

(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not

affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

(d) As soon as possible with their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been initiated.

Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:

## STAGE I

### A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization

(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

(b) The IDO shall have: (i) a General Conference of all the parties; (ii) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states as rotating basis; and (iii) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective, impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (i) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (ii) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (iii) provide for the establish-

Indemnity of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuing study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

#### B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 1.1 million each for all other multiply significant states. Reductions in the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prohibited types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be supervised by members of commissions to deposit supervised by the IBO. When, at specified periods during the Stage 1 reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments to deposit shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Committee shall be established within the IBO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for decommissioning the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons weapons and the halting of their production.

#### C. To Control and Reduce the Nuclear Threat

(a) States that have not accorded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissile materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissile materials for use in weapons, agreed limited quantities of fissile materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

(d) Any fissile materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.

(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not enrich plutonium or such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek to receive information or material necessary for their manufacture.

(f) A Nuclear Experts Committee consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the IBO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

#### D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to ensure such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to deposit supervised by the IBO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage 1 reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IBO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to ensure such vehicles shall be discontinued as limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to ensure such vehicles shall be limited as limited.

#### E. To Prevent the Proliferation of Outer Space

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

- (b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IGO of launching of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

**F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Alertless, Missiles, Attacks, and Surprise Attacks**

- (a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IGO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale or map to agreed, which might give rise to concentration of forces, alarm and other concentrations. The notification shall include the geographic area to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, main highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack, as may be agreed.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IGO to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by surprise, missiles, attacks, or failure of communication.

**G. To Keep the Peace:**

- (a) States shall confirm their obligation under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed forces— including nuclear, conventional, or CBW—contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the reduction and progressive development of international law.

- (d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a U.N. Peace Force.

- (e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

**STAGE II**

**A. International Disarmament Organization:**

- (a) Powers and responsibilities of the IGO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

**B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:**

- (a) Levels of forces for the U.S., USSR, and other similarly significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts in agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.
- (b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IGO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
- (c) There shall be further agreed minimums on the production of armaments.

- (d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

- (e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts' Commission on CBW weapons, the production of CBW weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

**C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:**

- Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the final

ings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting cuts of fissile material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.

#### D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

##### E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, states shall develop under the peacekeeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to ensure that the United Nations will be able effectively to prevent states against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The UNR Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

### STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence gained through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peacekeeping processes within the framework of the UN, should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive extended disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to

a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened UNR Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear arsenals, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed man-

power for a USI Peace Force.


(b) The UNR Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the UNR Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be demarcated or restricted to peaceful purposes.

(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to ensure peace and the non-existent of conflict in a changed world.

# THIS IS STATE DEPT. PUBL. #7277.\*

It is the  
policy  
book that  
explains  
Public Law  
87-297



- \* The disbanding or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and

## DISARMAMENT STAGES

The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take place in three stages and for the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions.

Pg.  
5

Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and

Pg.  
5

As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;

Pg.  
5

Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;

Pg.  
5

Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;

Pg.  
5

All items above have been clipped from the State Department booklet No. 7277 (above).

## \* THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

THIS PUBLICATION  
IS AN ABRIDGEMENT  
OF THE "BLUEPRINT  
FOR THE PEACE RACE,"  
WHICH IS MORE EX-  
PLICIT.

Pg.  
9

The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

Pg.  
3

The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligation of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

Pg.  
10

The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

Pg.  
10

Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.

Pg.  
7

States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.

Pg.  
9



# Moore KOs Lavorante in 10th

LATE  
NEWS  
RACING

Los Angeles Times

SATURDAY

MID-DAY

EDUCATION

HOME MAIL-PART ONE

FRIDAY MORNING, MARCH 22, 1963

7:30 A.M. (Channel 3)

6:30 P.M.

8:30 P.M.

# U.S. FORMULA FOR PEACE

## One Military Force Under U.N. Control

### News Summary

#### THE WORLD

SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE: Soviet and Chinese Communists have agreed to form a military alliance with mutual defense in their mutual defense pact.

U.S. AND CANADA: A second U.S.-Can. meeting on the U.S.-Canada defense pact was held in Ottawa yesterday. The two countries also signed a defense pact.

U.S. AND BRAZIL: Secretary of State Dean Rusk met with his Brazilian counterpart in Rio de Janeiro to discuss the situation in South America.

#### THE NATION

WORLD INFORMATION: The U.S. government has made available to the public and to the news media a new information system on world affairs.

ASSASSINATION: President John F. Kennedy's assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, has been indicted by a Dallas grand jury.

ASSASSINATION: The Dallas grand jury rejected the theory of "multiple assassins" in the killing of President Kennedy.

ASSASSINATION: The most recent evidence against Lee Harvey Oswald was presented by the Dallas grand jury.

ASSASSINATION: Lee Harvey Oswald was indicted by a Dallas grand jury on charges of conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

#### THE CITY AND THE STATE

ASSASSINATION: Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, has left Boston today to return to New York City.

ASSASSINATION: A man who is identified as a member of the Black Panthers has been arrested in Boston.

ASSASSINATION: Two Boston police officers were injured in the explosion of a car bomb in the early morning hours of Friday, March 15.

#### SPORTS

ASSASSINATION: Don Lavorante, boxer, was killed in a car accident in the Los Angeles neighborhood of Glendale, Calif., on Saturday night.

ASSASSINATION: Two boxers, Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier, have agreed to meet in a fight.

ASSASSINATION: The New England Patriots will play the Atlanta Falcons in a football game at Atlanta on Sunday.



Actress Elizabeth Taylor and her husband, actor Richard Burton, are shown in a scene from the movie "Cleopatra."

### Liz, Richard Go Night-Clubbing: Eddie Denies Marriage Is on Rocks

LOS ANGELES: Last night Elizabeth Taylor and her husband, Richard Burton, were seen at a night club in West Hollywood.

The couple, who have been separated since last summer, were seen leaving the night club together.

Earlier in the day, Burton was seen at a hotel in West Hollywood, where he was staying.

Taylor and Burton have been separated since last summer, but they have been seen together recently.

Taylor and Burton have been seen together recently.

### MTA Boosts Street Car, Bus Fares

MTA Changes Service Effective Jan. 1

MTA Increases Subsidy

MTA Reduces Subsidy

### Plan Will Be Offered Geneva Conference to Counter Soviet Treaty

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND: United States will submit to the Geneva Conference a plan calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons within three years and strict regulation by a United Nations force, officials announced today.

U.S. officials plan to submit their proposal to the Geneva Conference on Jan. 1, 1964, and to insist that the plan be adopted by the Geneva Conference.

U.S. officials said the plan would call for the immediate dismantling of all nuclear weapons.

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### Secret Army Captures Three French Outposts

PARIS: French secret agents captured three French outposts in the northern part of the country yesterday, the Defense Ministry said.

The captures were made by agents of the secret service, the Defense Ministry said.

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### 2 Children, 4 Men Die in Southland Traffic

BURBANK, CALIF.: Two children and four men died yesterday in a series of traffic accidents in the Southland area.

Two children and four men died yesterday in a series of traffic accidents in the Southland area.

Two children and four men died yesterday in a series of traffic accidents in the Southland area.

### CANDIDATES FOR GOVERNOR VIEW ISSUES

LOS ANGELES: The candidates for governor of California are viewing issues of importance to the state.

LOS ANGELES: The candidates for governor of California are viewing issues of importance to the state.

LOS ANGELES: The candidates for governor of California are viewing issues of importance to the state.

LOS ANGELES: The candidates for governor of California are viewing issues of importance to the state.

Dominican Mob Tries to Grab 'Spies'

Los Angeles Times  
Sunday Edition  
MARCH 19, 1961  
Volume 100 No. 12  
Price 50¢

SATURDAY  
**Los Angeles Times** **FINAL**

100% U.S. 100% U.S. 100% U.S. 100% U.S. 100% U.S.

SATURDAY EDITION, MARCH 18, 1961

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100% U.S.

# U.S. TO PROPOSE END OF NATIONAL ARMIES

NO ARMY

NO NAVY

NO AIR FORCE

Plan for U.N. Peace  
Force Ready to Be  
Submitted at Geneva

Los Angeles Times  
SUNDAY EDITION, MARCH 18, 1961  
100% U.S. 100% U.S. 100% U.S.

## U.S. THREE-STAGE DISARMAMENT PLAN

STAGE I



PEACEKEEPING  
MACHINERY



STAGE II

INTERNAL  
SECURITY  
FORCES

INTERNAL  
SECURITY  
FORCES

STAGE III



There was a time when the newspapers reported on the "general and complete disarmament program"

just as you see here, but soon the newspapers were bought out because of the outcry from the then-informed public.


Unfortunately, new generations have come in and they know little or nothing of the continuing plan.

Folks, if you doubt what I am telling you, make a visit to your federal depository library and ask to be shown a full copy of P.L. 87-297. They may hide Sections 2551, 2552 (a), 2571 (a), etc. of Title 22 U.S.C. Insist that you be shown these sections.

These sections have never been rescinded.

 Go ahead, pull this page up, and take a look at this shocking booklet printed by the U. S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency. When John Kennedy spoke to the United Nations on September 25, 1961, this "Blueprint for the Peace Race" booklet was not yet ready, so Kennedy ordered the State Department to briefly summarize its contents using the little blue book called "FREEDOM FROM WAR". (I just showed you that little blue book called State Dept. Publication #7277 just a few pages back.) Six months later this booklet became published. When the president speaks of "peace" this is what he is referring to! No Army! No Navy! No Air Force! And no guns for the citizens!

THIS BOOKLET IS THE GUIDE BOOK THAT EXPLAINS THE DETAILS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-297 AND PUBLIC LAW 101-216





# BLUEPRINT FOR THE PEACE RACE

Outline of Basic Provisions  
of a Treaty on  
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

# BLUEPRINT FOR THE PEACE RACE

*Outline of Basic Provisions  
of a Treaty on  
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World*

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

"...not to an arm's race but to a peace  
race—the ultimate together step by step,  
state by state, until general and complete  
disarmament has been achieved."

**REBUTTAL TO COMMENT**

September 26, 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY PUBLICATION 4

Revised May 1962

Second Series I

Revised May 1962

Printed by the Government of Canada, Ottawa, U.L. Government Printer, 1962.

# Statement by President Kennedy

Press Conference, April 18, 1962

The United States has today tabled at Geneva an outline of every basic provision of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. It provides a blueprint of our position on general and complete disarmament, as well as disengagement of the nations, sequence, and timing of specific disarmament measures.

This outline of a treaty represents the most comprehensive and specific series of proposals the United States or any other country has ever made on disarmament. In addition to stating the objectives and principles which should govern agreements for disarmament, the document calls for the grouping of individual measures in three balanced and interrelated stages. We are hopeful through the give-and-take of the conference table this plan will have a constructive influence upon the negotiations now in progress.

I want to stress that with this plan the United States is making a major effort to achieve a breakthrough on disarmament negotiations. We believe that the nations represented at Geneva have a heavy responsibility to lay the foundations for a genuinely secure and peaceful world starting through a reduction in arms.

## Foreword

An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law, and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. Today, in a world riven by dangerous tensions and mistrust, the attainment of this goal requires continuing and patient efforts to achieve the progressive reduction of national armament capabilities in such a manner as to increase the security of all nations. Thus, responsible arms control and disarmament proposals cannot be directed toward the attainment of unilateral political or military advantage. They must be fully responsive to the legitimate security interests of all nations.

On the basis of these considerations, President Kennedy on September 23, 1961, presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations the "United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." To provide a more precise statement of the United States approach to disarmament and the manner in which that approach should be implemented, the United States on April 16, 1962, presented to the conference of the UN-Advisory Committee on Disarmament, meeting in Geneva, an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." Although not a draft treaty, the "Outline" describes and encompasses the proposals of September 23 and provides in specific terms a substantial basis for the negotiation of arms control and disarmament treaty obligations.

The principal provisions of the United States Outline are described in the summary that follows. The complete text of the Outline begins on page 5.

# Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

## SUMMARY

### Principles and Process of Disarmament

Disarmament would be implemented progressively and in a balanced manner so that at no stage could any state or group of states obtain military advantage. Compliance with obligations would be effectively verified. As national armaments were reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened.

Disarmament would be accomplished in three stages—the first to be carried out in 3 years; the second, also in 3 years; and the third, as promptly as possible within an agreed period of time. Stage I would be initiated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other agreed states. All militarily significant states would participate in Stage II; and all states possessing armaments and armed forces, in Stage III.

Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon a determination that all undertakings in the preceding stage had been carried out and that all preparations for the next stage had been made.

### Disarmament Measures

A. **ARMAMENT.** During Stage I, inventories of major categories of both nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments would be reduced by 30 percent. Fixed launching pads would be reduced with associated missiles. Half of the remaining inventories would be eliminated during Stage II, and final reductions would be made in Stage III. Upon the completion of Stage III, states would have at their disposal only agreed types of non-nuclear armaments for forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

Production of armaments during Stage I would be limited to agreed allowances and would be compensated for by the destruction of additional armaments to the end that reductions would not be impeded. In Stage II, production of armaments would be halted except for parts for maintenance of retained armaments. Any further produc-

tion of national armaments would be ended in Stage III except for permission of agreed types of non-nuclear armaments for internal forces. Military research, development, and testing would be subject to increasing limitations during the disarmament process. During Stage III, appropriate actions would be taken to insure that new scientific discoveries and technological inventories of military significance were not used for military purposes.

B. **Arms races.** Force levels of the United States and Soviet Union would be reduced to 2.1 million at the end of Stage I. Half of the remaining force of these two states would be disbanded during Stage II, and final reductions would be made in Stage III. Other states would also progressively reduce their force levels. By the end of Stage III, states would have at their disposal only those agreed force and related organisational arrangements required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

C. **Nuclear weapons.** Production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons would be halted in Stage I, and limitations would be imposed on the production of fissionable materials for other purposes. The availability of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons would be reduced during Stage I and subsequent stages by safeguarded transfers to non-nuclear weapons purposes.

If nuclear weapons tests had not already been halted under effective international control, arrangements to this end would be undertaken in Stage I. States which had manufactured nuclear weapons would agree in Stage I not to transfer control over nuclear weapons to states which had not manufactured them or to assist such states in their manufacture. States which had not manufactured nuclear weapons would refrain from seeking them. Transfers of fissionable materials between states would be limited to peaceful purposes and would be safeguarded.

D. **Outer Space.** The placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit would be prohibited in Stage I, and limitations would be imposed on the production, stockpiling, and testing of boosters for space vehicles. States would support increased cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space.

E. **Military Bases.** Reduction of military bases, wherever they might be located, would be initiated in Stage II, and final reductions would be made in Stage III.

F. **Military Exports.** Military exports would be reported throughout the disarmament process.

## Verification

The verification of disarmament would be the responsibility of an International Disarmament Organization, which would be established within the framework of the United Nations. Reductions of armaments and armed forces would be verified at agreed locations; and limitations on production, testing, and other specified activities, at declared locations. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities subject to limitation or prohibition were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided through arrangements which would relate the extent of inspection at any time to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the risk to the disarming states of possible violations.

Such assurance might, for example, be accomplished through arrangements under which states would divide themselves into a number of zones through which inspection would be progressively extended. By the end of Stage III, when disarmament had been completed, all parts of the territory of states would have been inspected.

## Reduction of the Risk of War

To prevent accidents and reduce the risk of war during the disarmament process, states would, beginning in Stage I, give advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers, establish observation posts to report on concentrations and movements of military forces, and insure rapid and reliable communications among heads of governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

An International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War would examine possible extensions and improvements of such measures as well as additional measures to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack.

## Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

In Stage I, states would undertake obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force of any type contrary to the United Nations Charter. Throughout the three stages of disarmament, states would use all available means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, would seek to improve processes for this purpose, and would support measures to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security.

A United Nations Peace Observation Corps would be established in Stage I, and a United Nations Peace Force, in Stage II. The United Nations Peace Force, which would be equipped with agreed

types of armaments and would be supplied agreed manpower by states, would be progressively strengthened until, in Stage III, it would be fully capable of insuring international security in a disarmed world.

## **Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World**

### **COMPLETE TEXT**

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty.

#### **A. Characteristics**

1. To insure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
  2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:
    - (a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, reduction of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
    - (b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;
    - (c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;
    - (d) Abolition of the organisations and institutions designed to organise the military efforts of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;
    - (e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.
  3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for general and complete disarmament, states would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.
  4. To insure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with

the Treaty and other tensions requirements had been satisfied. Stage II would begin when all areas pending and known pending armaments had become subject to the Treaty and other tensions had been resolved. Disarmament, verification, and requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and requirements for bringing the power under greatest responsibility, and responsibilities before the entry into force of the Treaty.

## Stage I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

### B. Powers

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives is:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by steps to be carried out within specified time limits.
2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the Treaty would any state or group of states gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all.
3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be efficiently checked through the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and the inspection would have unrestricted access without notice to all.

The disarmament program would be phased and a parallel program of disarmament of personnel and equipment discontinued; and to this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization and its inspection would have unrestricted access without notice to all.

1. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would provide checks and other checks among member countries to ensure that all measures in the preceding stages had been taken to facilitate the development of international cooperation as well as to facilitate the development of mankind.

2. Transitions from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stages had been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

## Introduction

The Treaty would establish three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signatures and ratifications of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other states so far as they be agreed. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states had become Parties to

- (1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater, missiles having a range of 2,000 kilometers or greater, together with their related land launching pads and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 200 kilometers or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft, Atlas missiles together with their related land launching pads. These missiles together with their related land launching pads, Polaris missiles; Hound

Supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

a. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that finished armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

### 3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph I above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halved except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed finished armaments.

b. The allowances would permit limited production in each of the categories of armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph I above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments:

(1) any armament produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional amount denoted within that category to the end that the ten percent reduction is turned in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved; and furthermore

(2) in the case of armament already having an empty weight of 15,000 kilograms or greater and of missiles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater, the destructive capability of any such armaments produced within a category would be compensated for by the destruction of sufficient armaments within that category in the end that the ten percent reduction in destructive capability as well as numbers in each of those categories in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its production in any category in subparagraph b above, that Party would be entitled to retain existing armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its production allowances. In any such instance, any amount so retained would be compensated for in the manner set forth in subparagraph b (1) and, where applicable, b (2) above to the end that the ten percent reduction in numbers and, where applicable, destructive capability in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

d. The right to testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

- e. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under

Dog-missiles, and each new type of armament, such as Missiles and missiles, which came within the category description, together with others applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The Parties would declare the category by which Particles to the Treaty would be similarly classified).

(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 10,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within this category).

(3) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched) missiles and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and low-reaction air-to-air missiles having a range of between 10 kilometers and 300 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within this category).

(4) Anti-aircraft missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(5) Surface-to-surface missiles other than anti-aircraft missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(6) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(7) Armored cars and armored personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(8) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(9) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carrier, battleship, cruiser, destroyer-type and submarines. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

### 2. Method of Reduction

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the signed date.

b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during Stage I would be carried out during each step.

c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under

e. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex to verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the freezing moment at declared forces and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

#### 4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to conclude unclassified measures relating to means of armament in Plague II and III relating to reduction and control of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of this conclusion, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

## B. ARMED FORCES

### 1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Forces levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with appropriate exception, reduce their levels to 160,000 or one percent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

### 2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national governments in the following categories:

- Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed assignments or contracts;
- Contractors performing their required parts of defense activity in fixed by national law;
- Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations employed and organized to perform a military mission;

### 3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

- Both Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.

b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of Stage I.

- In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex to verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that related forces did not exceed agreed levels.

#### 4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the negotiations regarding force levels.

## C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

### 1. Production of Fissileable Materials for Nuclear Weapons

a. The Parties to the Treaty would limit the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.

b. This measure would be carried out in the following manner:

(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissileable materials at the agreed date.

(2) Production of fissileable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissileable materials which were still being produced at each facility.

(3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex to verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

### 2. Transfer of Fissileable Material to Programs Other Than Nuclear Weapons

- Upon the cessation of production of fissileable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to partners other than those in nuclear weapons an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235.

from past production. The purpose for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the material belonged, provided that such materials were not used as nuclear weapons.

- To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organisation either in stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.

#### *3. Transfer of Plutonium Metals from Prospective Annex of Nuclear Energy*

a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

- The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

#### *4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

- Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured, or which at any time manufactured, a nuclear weapon would:
  - Not transfer control over any nuclear weapon to a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;
  - Not assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapon.
- Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:
  - Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapon;
  - Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapon.

#### *5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions*

- If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would

become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

b. If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test, negotiations would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

#### *4. Additional Measures*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unratified questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements to accomplish nuclear weapons stockpiles.

#### *D. OUTER SPACE*

##### *1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Outer Space*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

##### *2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.

##### *3. Negotiation and Pre-launch Inspections*

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:

- These Parties to the Treaty which conducted launches of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launches to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification could be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.
- In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launches.

##### *4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities*

The production, stocking and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization.

In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex or verification.

## E. MILITARY EXPENDITURES

### 1. Report on Expenditure

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organisation at the end of each step of such stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include an itemisation of military expenditures.

### 2. Periodic Revision of Expenditure

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.

## F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following initiatives:

### 1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Measures

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and measures to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organisation. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the code of movements and measures to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed.

### 1. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway stations, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts would be progressively expanded at each successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

### 2. Additional Clearance Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I.

### 4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

### 5. Communication Between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their heads of government and with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary General.

### 6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organisation to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during Stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communication, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures to might be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

## G. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

### 1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organisation

The International Disarmament Organisation would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

### 2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organisation and to assist the International Disarmament Organisation in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

### A. Participation Functions of the International Disarmament Organisation

The International Disarmament Organisation would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which

should be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:

- Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations.
- Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be carried by the International Disarmament Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.

c. Assumes that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of preventing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement concluding with features on the following:

- All parts of the territory of these Parties to the Treaty in which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided below.
- Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of geographical zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total kind of armaments, forces and specified types of activities subject to verification, within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.
- An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during Stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedure which would ensure that independently Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and

other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide guarantees against undetected movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or areas being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. To the far as agreed measures being verified were concerned, areas within the zone would be free and unguarded, and verification would be carried out with the full cooperation of the state being inspected.

(ii) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while activities were being conducted in additional zones.

(iii) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty.

#### 4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

- The International Disarmament Organization would have:
  - A Central Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;
  - A Council Council consisting of representatives of all the member governments as permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and
  - An administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Council Council and who would have the authority, staff, and financial resources to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the function of the International Disarmament Organization.
- The Central Conference and the Central Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

#### 5. Functions of the Central Conference

- Establishing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;
- Appointing a secretary general to the Treaty;
- Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Central Council;
- Approving agreements between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;
- Requesting and receiving reports from the Central Council and dealing with matters referred to it by the Central Council;

- e. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;

b. Proposing matters for consideration by the Central Council;

i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorisation of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by the Parties to the Treaty;

k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or arrangement in general.

**4. Functions of the Central Council**


The Central Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

  - a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator;
  - b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;
  - c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining rapport with such arrangements and the Administrator;
  - d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;
  - e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of arrangements, measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;
  - f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organisation;
  - g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorisation of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
  - h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty;
  - i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or arrangement in general.

**5. Functions of the Administrator**

The Administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

  - a. Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organisation;
  - b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;



2. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organisation;
3. Making reports to the Central Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

#### 3. *Parties and Immunities*

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organisation and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organisation, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organisation should enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty.

#### 4. *Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organisations*

a. The International Disarmament Organisation, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organisation would consult with the Secretary General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.

b. The Central Council of the International Disarmament Organisation would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organisation.

c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organisation, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

**Kerry:** The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organisation and the United Nations.

## II. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

#### 1. *Obligations Governing the Threat or Use of Force*

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type—including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare—contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

#### 3. *Powers of International Control*

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organisation of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.
- b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from leading aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph a would also study methods of ensuring states against indirect aggression and subversion.

#### 2. *Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilise all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other state, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.
- b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiations or by the International Disarmament Organisation should be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.
- c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

- d. *Maintenance of International Peace and Security*  
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

#### 3. *United Nations Peace Force*

- The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:
- a. Disarmament of the expenses of the United Nations leading to a further streamlining of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;

1. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 42 of the United Nations Charter;
2. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

#### *a. United Nations Peace Observation Corps*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or in breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observations Corps might also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

#### **1. TRANSITION**

1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I, upon a determination that the prevailing circumstances entitled:

  - a. All understandings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out;
  - b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and
  - c. All sufficiently significant states had become parties to the Treaty;

2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Central Council would receive the information regarding those circumstances with a view to determining whether those circumstances existed at the end of Stage I;
3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Central Council should determine that the prevailing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage I would extend the report of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period of up to one month, not exceeding no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances;
4. If, upon the adoption of such period or period(s), one or more of the permanent members of the Central Council had determined that the prevailing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before the General Assembly of the Security Council, resolution in Stage II would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did not exist.

## **Stage II**

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament, in the manner outlined below:

  3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II; and
  4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

#### *A. ARMAMENTS*

##### *1. Reduction of armaments*

- a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty percent would during Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in Section A, subparagraph 1 of Stage I by fifty percent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I.
- b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration regarding the inventories by types, within the categories listed in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by thirty-five percent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty percent in Stage I.
2. *Additional armaments Subject to Reduction*
- a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of Stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in subparagraph 4 below, and would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by fifty percent.
- b. All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

  - (i) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of less than 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types);

(ii) Specified types of unguided military aircraft (deterioration by type);

(ii) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometers (declarations by type);

(iv) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by type);

(v) Specified types of unmanned personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by type);

(vi) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by type);

(vii) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by type);

(viii) Specified types of small arms (declarations by type).

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph 1.b and in subparagraph b above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

### 2. Method of Reduction

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 1.

#### a. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed reduced armaments.

b. The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

d. In accordance with arrangements to which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurances that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

#### 3. Additional Measures

a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production

and stocks of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:

(i) The reduction of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction;

(ii) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stocks of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty percent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II;

(iii) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty;

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurances that reduced levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

## B. ARMED FORCES

### 1. Reduction of Armed Forces

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:

(i) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels fifty percent below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I;

(ii) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during Stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other Parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage I.

## 2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage I.

### a. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with reduced force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.

## C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

### 1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their commitment during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons:

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amount, type and nature of utilization of all their fissile materials.
- b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissile materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. This long-term reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purpose for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissile materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.

- d. Production or fabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissile materials would be subject to agreed limitations.
- e. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament

Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

### 2. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes

To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of Stage II, register and disclose their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissile materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and verification would be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex to verification.

## D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

### 1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

### 2. Method of Reduction

- a. The list of military bases and facilities which would be set forth in an annex to the annex to verification, the International Disarmament Organization would apply the foregoing measures.

## E. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In the light of the conclusion by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War that Stages I and II of the Treaty as they stand would not add additional arrangements as appeared desirable to prevent conflicts and reduce the risk of war, The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stages I for this purpose. The Commission would review in substance of existing constraints, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after Stages II.

## F. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

### 1. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.

#### 4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would establish arrangements for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

## G. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

### 1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to ensure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.

### 2. Rules of International Conflict

a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conflict related to direct aggression. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Central Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified that they disapproved, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.

b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to ensure states against indirect aggression and subversion.

### 3. Unified Legislation

These Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdictions and providing appropriate penalties for noncompliance.

## H. TRANSITION

1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage II, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:
  - a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out;
  - b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and
  - c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty.
2. During the last three months of Stage II, the Central Council would review the situation regarding these circumstances with a view to determining at the end of Stage II whether they existed.
3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Council should advise that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the "normal" period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totaling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members<sup>1</sup> of the Central Council should decide that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the position would be placed before a special session of the Security Council<sup>2</sup> resolution to Stage III would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the proposed circumstances did in fact exist.

## Stage III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible. During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II;
2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined before;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organisation would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of concluding verification subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

would cease to be demanded or converted to peaceful uses at full time for such purposes.

- b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty:
  - i. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organisation would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that armaments subject to the foregoing measures were not located at undisclosed locations.

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have in their disposal only those forces and organisational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would conclude the reduction of their forces levels, disclosed, registers of reserve forces, cause to be disclosed organisational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

### 2. Method of Reduction

- a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty:
  - b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organisation would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organisational arrangements retained or subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing armed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force.

### 3. Other Limitations

- The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to amend legislation concerning national military establishments or military service limitations with the foregoing measures.

would cease to be demanded or converted to peaceful uses at full time for such purposes.

- b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty:
  - i. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organisation would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that armaments subject to the foregoing measures were not located at undisclosed locations.

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have in their disposal only those forces and organisational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would conclude the reduction of their forces levels, disclosed, registers of reserve forces, cause to be disclosed organisational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

### 2. Method of Reduction

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### 3. Other Limitations

- The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to amend legislation concerning national military establishments or military service limitations with the foregoing measures.

## C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

### 1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would dismantle or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

### 2. Method of Reduction

- The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex to verification, the International Disarmament Organisation would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

## D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

### 1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

### 2. Method of Reduction

- The lists of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex to verification, the International Disarmament Organisation would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.

## E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

### 1. Reporting Requirements

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subject to Stages III:

- The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organisation any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.
- The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International Disarmament Organisation that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty.
- The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organisation in accordance with subparagraph 3 above.

### 3. International Cooperation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international cooperation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and the interchange of views among scientists and technical personnel.

## F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

### 1. Improved Measures

In the light of the Stage II examination by the International Commission on Reductions of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such reductions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to protect confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Control Council would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after Stages III.

### 2. Application of Measures in Containing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply its national forces required to contain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens

those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

## G. INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to assist the members states in Stage III through its systems of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraphs 2 of Stage I, so that by the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing mechanisms of disarmament after the conclusion of Stage III.

## H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

### 1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

### 2. Role of International Council

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other agreed procedures.

### 3. United Nations Peace Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Forces established in Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it.

## I. COMPLETION OF STAGE III

- At the end of the three year or more of the permanent members of the Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertake to be carried out in Stage III had been carried out.

- In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Council should declare that such undertaking had not been carried out,

The agreed period of Stage III would open the option of such permanent member or members to extend for a period or periods totaling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Central Council should declare that such undertakings still had not been carried out, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council, which would determine whether Stage III had been completed.

2. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

## General Provisions Applicable to All Stages

### 1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedure would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time.

### 2. Interim Agreements

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

### 3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Adoption, and Entry into Force of the Treaty

a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or adoption, by all members of the United Nations or its specialised agencies.  
b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Central Council.

c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by \_\_\_\_\_ states, including the United States of America, the United

of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following states:

- a. In order to ensure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant states would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.
  - a. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other states or authorities to accede to the Treaty.
  - b. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional procedures.
  - c. A Depositary Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depositary. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depositary.
- b. Finance
  - a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organisation, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organisation's expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.
  - b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organisation.
- c. Appendices

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.



**Do you believe  
that we can  
retain  
our sovereignty  
without  
an armed force  
to  
sustain it?**



Read this diagram across. It came from the "Second Annual Report to Congress". You are now in the last stage: Stage III. It gives proof that when you no longer have any national armed forces, you will be policed by military forces. Soldiers from many lands have already been trained to occupy this country.



**NO ARMY**  
**NO NAVY**  
**NO AIR FORCE**

(AND NO GUNS FOR THE CITIZENS)

Catch on!  
You are  
being  
sold out!

### U.S. THREE-STAGE DISARMAMENT PLAN



The above diagram was taken from the "Second Annual Report to Congress" January 1, 1962 - December 31, 1962 - United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency - Publication 14, February 1963, Page 11.

# New World Order

As you read the above diagram, across the span of the three helmets on a horizontal plane, notice that nations go through a reduction in all three stages until there are ~~E-X-E-C~~ armed forces in the third stage while the Peacekeeping Machinery becomes increasingly strengthened for COMMAND under the Security Council of the COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED United Nations. It is planned that the United States shall be permanently WITHOUT AN ARMY, A NAVY AND AN AIR FORCE. The Internal Security Forces that are to be assigned the duty of keeping order MAY OR MAY NOT be U.S. citizens. Martial rule shall prevail throughout the United States. Long guns and collector's items MUST also be banned so that the Internal Security Forces CANNOT BE CHALLENGED BY THE CITIZENS. Consult your local librarian or your U.S. Congressman for a copy of these important documents which show how the United States' military might is to be TRANSFERRED to INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

Tell your congressman that THIS IS AGAINST THE LAW. Tell him to repeal Public Law 87-297 and all the Amendments to that law.

# THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

## U.S. THREE-STAGE DISARMAMENT PLAN

STAGE I



STAGE II



STAGE III

INTERNAL  
SECURITY  
FORCES

INTERNAL  
SECURITY  
FORCES

PEACEKEEPING  
MACHINERY



Get a load  
of the last  
paragraph  
down here!



(a) Dissolution of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

Armed forces would be cut to a level of 1,100,000 men each for the Soviet Union and United States in the first stage, to 1,000,000 in the second stage, and to zero, except for small internal security and U.N. Peace Force contingents, in the third. Similar reductions in all of the foregoing categories would also have to be applied to other militarily significant powers in the second stage and to all states in the third stage.

# FREEDOM FROM WAR

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR  
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARM-  
AMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

- The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
- The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force.

EXCERPTED  
FROM



U.S.  
UNITED STATES  
PROGRAM FOR  
GENERAL AND  
COMPLETE  
DISARMAMENT  
IN A PEACEFUL  
WORLD


State Dept. Doc. 7277

# ZERO MILITARY

EXCERPTED  
FROM

Armed forces would be cut to a level of 2,100,000 men each for the Soviet Union and United States in the first stage, to 1,050,000 in the second stage, and to zero, except for small internal security and U.N. Peace Force contingents, in the third. Similar reductions in all of the foregoing categories would also have to be applied to other militarily significant powers in the second stage and to all states in the third stage.

2nd Report Arms Control & DISARMA-  
MENT AGENCY




READ ACROSS

from Page 11 Publication 14

ACTION RECOMMENDED: Visit or call your state representatives and protest the state's co-operation in these acts to overthrow our republic and the Constitution of the United States. A military defense is an essential to the American Union and the preservation of our Constitutional Compact and the Bill of Rights. The federal government cannot proceed without the help of the states.

Public Law 87-297



THE LAW PASSED IN 1961.

## Sec. 3. As used in this Act—

(a) The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" mean the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination of armed forces and armaments of all kinds under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement to establish an effective system of international control, or to create and strengthen international organizations for the maintenance of peace.

## TITLE III SEC. 3(a)


(a) the detection, identification, inspection, monitoring, limitation, reduction, control, and elimination of armed forces and armaments, including thermonuclear, nuclear, missile, conventional, bacteriological, chemical, and radiological weapons;

EXCERPTED  
FROM



This is an update to the parent document,  
Public Law 87-297. →  
The appropriations to keep financing the  
"general and complete disarmament pro-  
gram" are allocated every two years.  
Here is the one done in December of 1989.  
It was only 3 -1/2 pages in all!  
How could the Congress miss the section that  
is highlighted?  
The voting record is on the next page.

**George H. Bush signed this law in 1989 which is an Amendment to the General and Complete Disarmament Law (P.L. 89-297). Look on back to see who voted in favor of it!**



(2) as defined in this Act, the terms "arms control" and "disarmament" mean "the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination, of armed forces and armaments of all kinds under international agreement, to establish an effective system of international control";



A vote for Public Law 101-216 is a vote to support its parent document, Public Law 87-297. This is a clear-cut violation of the oath of office. Elimination of the nation's common defense destroys the sovereignty of the nation and obsoletes its Constitution!

Republicans and Democrats! Is there a dime's worth of difference? Public Law 101-216 was only a 3 page bill! It was no big job to find the definition of disarmament which was plainly in view, yet Congress voted to continue financing the giving away of our armed forces to the United Nations.

Look closely at the names of the congressmen who voted to support Public Law 101-216. It passed the Senate by voice vote.

## **CONFESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE**

**Fault line 191-210**

October 12, 1949

卷之三

This law divests us of all of our armed forces! That means No Army! No Navy! No Air Force! No National Guard!



**George H. W. Bush! You signed this into law! As president neither you nor the Congress were vested with the power to deprive this nation of its military.**

www.hanover.com

Anthony	Papalote	Mosher
Baptist	Oasis	West Africa
Cathexis	Departs	Wilson
Crusader	Hector	Quinton
Crookell	Hankie	Roseanne
Dawn	Malice	Yannick
Elbow	Miner	Yannick

**RECOMMENDED**

The Clerk announced the following:

On this vote:  
Mr. Murphy (sc.) with Mr. Quinn against.  
Mazara, KVL, RATERMAN, ADPIT,  
and KOLBE changed their vote from  
"No" to "Aye."

The term of the vote was announced.

← Look over this list  
to see who voted to eliminate  
the right to have armed forces  
to protect us, and to transfer  
them to the communists  
who dominate the United  
Nations. Many of the members  
of this House of Representatives  
are still in office posing as  
"conservatives".  
Perhaps, you can visualize what  
can happen when you  
are left completely  
unprotected.



**Public Law 87-297 was signed into  
"law" for the United States  
by Pres. John F. Kennedy.**

**Public Law 101-216 was signed into  
"law" for the United States  
by Pres. George Bush.**

**This is the speech that was delivered→  
before the United Nations  
by John F. Kennedy  
on September 25, 1961. Check back on  
Public Law 87-297  
and note that the  
very next day after Kennedy's speech,  
the Congress signed it into law!**